How do stories convince us? Notes towards a rhetoric of narrative.

How do stories convince us? Notes towards a rhetoric of narrative. I tell you he got more arguments out of stories than he did out of lawbooks, and the queer part was you couldn't answer 'em--they just madeyou see it and you couldn't get around it. I'm a Democrat, but I'll beblamed if I didn't have to vote for Mr. Lincoln as President, couldn'thelp it, and it was all on account of that snake story of his onilluminatin' the taking of slaves into Nebraska and Kansas. Remember it?(Tarbell 1907, 9) I How do stories convince? How do stories and "law books"appeal differently? How do narratives argue? This essay addresses these questions. They are important questions,not just for the literary scholar but also for every person. For the"story of our lives" is a central part of our self-talk and ofthe conversations about us. We live our lives as stories--or as"narratives," as the literary scholars prefer to say. Whateverthe term, the fact is that a deeper understanding of the subtle dynamicsof storytelling and "narratology Narratology is the theory and study of narrative and narrative structure and the way they affect our perception.[1] In principle, the word can refer to any systematic study of narrative, though in practice the use of the term is rather more restricted (see below). " can shed valuable light bothon literature and on our lives. The fictional stories that become part of our cultural fabric andsocial mythology both reflect and shape our lives: the plots of novelsand the "storied lives" of fictional characters influence ourlives (and resemble them too). We have much to learn from closer studyof literary narratives. Art not only "entertains," as Horaceobserves in The Art of Poetry, it also "edifies." Myreflections here aim to illuminate how stories edify ed��i��fy?tr.v. ed��i��fied, ed��i��fy��ing, ed��i��fiesTo instruct especially so as to encourage intellectual, moral, or spiritual improvement. us, whereby I alsoexplore the implications of their instruction (or"persuasion"). The three questions in my opening paragraph serve as a broadframework for our inquiry, which I explore from the perspective ofrhetorical studies, a field generally devoted to matters of persuasionand argumentation. I advance a conceptual outline for what might betermed "a rhetoric of narrative," i.e., if we considerrhetoric in the classical tradition as "argumentative Controversial; subject to argument.Pleading in which a point relied upon is not set out, but merely implied, is often labeled argumentative. Pleading that contains arguments that should be saved for trial, in addition to allegations establishing a Cause of Action or speech."For these are rhetorical questions--not in that they do not solicitanswers, but in that they demand rhetorical approaches toward answers.Among my concerns will be to distinguish narratio from narrative theory,persuasion from conviction, and narration's epistemic ep��i��ste��mic?adj.Of, relating to, or involving knowledge; cognitive.[From Greek epistm function fromits ontological status. In attempting to construct a rhetoric of narrative, we must take upnot only the what of narrative but also the how. We must venture beyondthe grammatical to the other two arts of the medieval trivium triv��i��um?n. pl. triv��i��aThe lower division of the seven liberal arts in medieval schools, consisting of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. : logic andrhetoric. The pioneering scholarly work in literary theory and narrativeaesthetics during the last three decades--which has been conducted bySeymour Chatman, Gerard Genette, Tzevetan Todorov, Roland Barthes Roland Barthes (November 12, 1915 – March 25, 1980) (pronounced [ʀɔlɑ̃ baʀt]) was a French literary critic, literary and social theorist, philosopher, and semiologist. ,Gerald Prince, Paul Ricoeur Paul Ricœur (February 27, 1913 Valence France – May 20, 2005 Chatenay Malabry France) was a French philosopher best known for combining phenomenological description with hermeneutic interpretation. , Mieke Bal, and numerous others--has focusedchiefly on the how of narrative, posing questions about storytelling andstory construction within the grammatical orbit. (1) This scholarship innarrative theory is vast and complex, and I will only allude briefly toit here. Fundamentally, it constitutes a "grammar" ofnarrative that has the part of speech as narrative's defining unit(Fisher 1984, 1-22). (2) For example, in Genette's view ofnarrative, the key unit is the verb (and its categories: tense, mood,voice); other grammatically based theories distinguish discourse typesaccording to according toprep.1. As stated or indicated by; on the authority of: according to historians.2. In keeping with: according to instructions.3. nominal/verbal distinctions. Such overarching noun/verbdistinctions oppose narrative stasis to succession, being to action, anddescription (or exposition, classification) to narration. Thus a grammatical approach to narrative identifies which kinds ofdiscourses are narratives, typically classifying them apart fromcategories such as exposition and classification. Such a grammar ofnarrative has been invaluable for building a taxonomy of storytellingfeatures and distinctions that can be separated and categorized, servingas markers differentiating "narratives" from other forms ofdiscourse. Grammar is understood here to concern itself with thelinguistic level of syntax, "getting words in the right order"(Frye 1957, 244). "Right" means "correct":grammarians are chiefly concerned with "correctness," ratherthan meaning or persuasiveness. Grammar does not address the levels ofsemantics [meaning] and pragmatics pragmaticsIn linguistics and philosophy, the study of the use of natural language in communication; more generally, the study of the relations between languages and their users. [purpose], which are the domains oflogic and rhetoric. II A grammatically based narrative theory can identify narrative fromnon-narrative, yet it does little to illuminate what and how a storymeans and argues. In considering questions other than marking narrativeand categorizing its modes of operation (e.g., pause, scene, summary,ellipsis A three-dot symbol used to show an incomplete statement. Ellipses are used in on-screen menus to convey that there is more to come. ), we enter the spheres of logic and rhetoric. We are stillconcerned here with grammatical issues insofar in��so��far?adv.To such an extent.Adv. 1. insofar - to the degree or extent that; "insofar as it can be ascertained, the horse lung is comparable to that of man"; "so far as it is reasonably practical he should practice as syntax (or"correctness") affects meaning and logic. But functionalissues such as identification and syntactic markers now give way to"higher-order" questions of meaning, for the part of speech isno longer the defining unit for narrative in these next two arts of thetrivium. What then becomes the defining unit for logic? If grammar is"right order," logic is "right order withsignificance." Grammar is pattern; logic is meaningful pattern. Soa "logic of narrative" would have the proposition as itsdefining unit, with axioms and postulates comprising its constituents.This is the dominant narrative type in scientific and philosophicaltreatises. Whereas a grammar of narrative is often discussed (e.g., in thework of Gerald Prince) as the representation of a succession of"events" in a temporal sequence, the orientation in a logic ofnarrative would be a tightly and rationally connected chain of"concepts," rather than "events." Whereas the aim ofgrammar is correctness, the aim of logic is proof. One"proves" in logic and mathematics by demonstrating resultsfrom premises, beginning with axioms and ending with theorems. As a result, a narrative theory combining these emphases of grammarand logic would probably include some distinction between"connection" and "interruption." For instance, abreak in the strict logical chain--an attempted connection that"does not follow" (the familiar non-sequitur) would not simplybe narration versus non-narration (exposition, classification), as in agrammar of narrative. Rather, it would be considered a narrative break.Thus the overarching distinction would be narration versus non-sense(literally, for we would have maintained the "pattern" yetlost the patterned meaning). Strictly on the level of a logic of narrative, therefore, non-sensebecomes equivalent to non-narrative, i.e., a "meaningless" orincomprehensible phrase (or clause or sentence) amounts to"non-narrative." It stops readers up short; our comprehensioncannot proceed. It is "disordered." Such an interruption inthe chain of propositions, so closely interconnected that each dependsupon the previous one for its validity, will here be said to constitute"non-narrative." I have sketched here a few postulates for a "logic" ofnarrative. My purpose is not only to distinguish it from our grammaticalapproaches. Logic also serves as a sort of "building block"for a rhetoric of narrative, in the same way that grammar (as merepattern) is the "ground" for logic as meaningful order. Forwhereas logic is meaningful pattern, rhetoric (as rationally basedargument, per the classical canon) is convincing pattern. III As with logic, the defining unit in rhetoric is the proposition.Whereas the syllogism syllogism,a mode of argument that forms the core of the body of Western logical thought. Aristotle defined syllogistic logic, and his formulations were thought to be the final word in logic; they underwent only minor revisions in the subsequent 2,200 years. is the instrument in logic, however, the enthymeme en��thy��meme?n. LogicA syllogism in which one of the premises or the conclusion is not stated explicitly.[Latin enth (the rhetorical syllogism that deals in probabilities rather thanproofs) is the instrument of rhetoric. The aim of rhetoric is not proofbut assent. We can now glimpse here a third level in our "buildingblock" approach toward a rhetoric of narrative. Whereas the"unfiltered Please wikify (format) this article or section as suggested in the Guide to layout and the Manual of Style.Remove this template after wikifying. This article has been tagged since stream" of history--the "undigested"flow of events--is a pure model of a grammar of narrative, the carefullynumbered propositions of a geometry text exemplify a logic of narrative.By contrast, "literature" in a very broad sense corresponds toa rhetoric of narrative. We should consider such distinctions based in the trivium asmatters of emphasis rather than as a matter of pure types. Thus, allpersonal or human history is filtered in some way by individual minds orcultures; no mathematical or philosophical treatise, as Northrop Fryenotes, can speak entirely with "the voice of Reason Itself."Philosophers' attempts to reduce grammar to logic (or vice versa VICE VERSA. On the contrary; on opposite sides. )have not been successful. "The only road from grammar to logic,then, runs through the intermediate territory of rhetoric," saysFrye. Pure history as grammatical narrative, or mathematics as logicalnarrative, illustrates the hypothetical union of logic with grammar.Frye describes literature as "the rhetorical organization ofgrammar and logic.... Persuasive rhetoric is applied literature, or theuse of literary art to reinforce the power of argument" (1957, 245)(3). Like a logic of narrative, a rhetoric of narrative moves byconcepts. Yet they are not concerned chiefly with logical abstractions,valid proofs, and taut propositional linkages. A rhetoric of narrativedoes still include a substantial rational component, but its conceptsare less dry or mechanical or head-centered, and instead morefull-bodied and even impassioned. They are rational but also emotive andethical. Rhetoric in the classical view (as developed by Aristotle, Ciceroand Quintilian) must first and foremost establish"reasonableness" and persuasiveness, not conceptual rigor rigor/rig��or/ (rig��er) [L.] chill; rigidity.rigor mor��tis? the stiffening of a dead body accompanying depletion of adenosine triphosphate in the muscle fibers. orprecision. Emotional appeals and ethical proofs (e.g., referring tocharacter and personal histories) are acknowledged as powerful means ofpersuasion A means of persuasion, in some theories of politics and economics, can substitute for a factor of production by providing some influence or information. This may be of direct value to the actor accepting the influence, i.e. , but they are presumed to function within an orderlyframework of facts and ideas. Because rhetoric, concerned primarily withaudience assent rather than formal proof, possesses a much looserpropositional chain than logic (i.e., rhetoric is linked by theprobabilities of enthymemes rather than the airtight rigor ofsyllogisms), it will also distinguish non-narrative differently thandoes logic. Such a rhetoric of narrative would continue to build upon andincorporate our narrative theory distinctions on the levels of grammarand logic; it would be based on a distinction between sequences of"events" and sequences of "concepts." Theoverarching distinction would be narration versus argument. Narration inthis sense would be primarily expository or informative. (Nevertheless,as I will demonstrate later, narrative categories such as description,classification, and especially explanation can also operateargumentatively.) Since its units of identification have neither the taut precisionof parts of speech nor of geometric, logical chains, the twin tasks offormulating a rhetoric of narrative and distinguishing narrative (as"mere" information) from argument are more nuanced andinterpretive than at the lower levels. We may say that a"break" in the rational/emotional chain of propositions, eachof which must somehow advance the argument, constitutes "merenarration," or aimless storytelling (i.e., as in a tangent ordigression). If the break is extreme or continues, we may have a"pure" short story or novel (or rant or free-association dreamnarrative), rather than a "rational argument." By contrast, abreak in the temporal sequence of events, each unit of which furnishesbits of data to the audience, constitutes "argument"--if thecessation of information flow shifts to the stuff of argumentation:advancing claims and contradictions, internal summary andrecapitulation recapitulation,theory, stated as the biogenetic law by E. H. Haeckel, that the embryological development of the individual repeats the stages in the evolutionary development of the species. , proposing changes in action or attitude. (4) Of course, these differences will often be much more difficult tomark than in our previous two domains, i.e., between narration anddescription, or between narration and non-sense. Rather, thenarration/argument distinction is a matter of emphasis, with a HenryJames story (or any formalist narrative) closer to the narration poleand an essay/editorial closer to the argument pole. Still, if we were toexplore them carefully, we would find that both the Henry James storyand the essay contain narrative and argumentative elements. They consistof both patterned events and concepts. Whether operating in thenarrative or in the argumentative mode, literature may use description,exposition, ellipsis, pause, summary, and scene-setting either to informor argue. IV This preliminary attempt to identify narrative as opposed toargument constitutes the what of a rhetoric of narrative, and it alsoreturns us to our opening triad of questions. But two of thoseintroductory questions must now be reworded and expanded further. Weshould be asking, "How do stories convince audiences? How donarratives appeal to people--i.e., to readers/listeners/viewers?" The different wording is critical to our rhetorical approach. Ourinitial phrasing, "How do stories argue?" conforms to agrammatical conception of narrative theory, with the "story"as a structure, a "represented world." This way of inquiringabout narrative as argument posits a fictional world which we as readersenter. That world is rendered intelligible insofar as we possesssemantic "codes" (Barthes, Chatman). Barthes' codes (fivein all) are each "one of the forces that can take over thetext." They interweave in a structural network and are dimly"heard like off-stage voices" as they "de-originate"the textual "utterance" and converge into "writing astereographic ster��e��og��ra��phy?n.1. The art or technique of depicting solid bodies on a plane surface.2. Photography that involves the use of stereoscopic equipment. space." Their origin as voices is "lost" inthe universe of the "already-written" and they function withinthe vast "stereographic space" of "writing" as a"collective and anonymous voice originating in traditional humanexperience" (Barthes 1970, 18-20). (5) By contrast, a rhetoric of narrative begins with a view ofnarrative not as a world but rather as a communicative act, i.e., anintersubjective experience between speaker and audience (orlistener/viewer). Unlike narrative theory derived from structuralistpoetics, it does not postulate postulate:see axiom. a "collective and anonymous"Voice (or Barthes' "Voices": the Voice of Empirics[classifying], the Voice of Person [referential frame, vocalperspective], the Voice of Science [cultural codes], the Voice of Truth[interpreting], and the Voice of Symbol [multivalent meaning]). Rather,it sees narrative as interpersonal communication Interpersonal communication is the process of sending and receiving information between two or more people. Types of Interpersonal CommunicationThis kind of communication is subdivided into dyadic communication, Public speaking, and small-group communication. , i.e., as an actbetween a particular speaking subject and a responding listener.Narrative is an enunciative e��nun��ci��ate?v. e��nun��ci��at��ed, e��nun��ci��at��ing, e��nun��ci��atesv.tr.1. To pronounce; articulate.2. act, a matter of reader performance or"story-telling." On this view, the term "narrative"itself is revealing: narrative suggests both a "story-"(intelligible as a world) and a "-telling" (assignable to aspeaker, or narrator NARRATOR. A pleader who draws narrs serviens narrator, a sergeant at law. Fleta, 1. 2, c. 37. Obsolete. ) (Langellier 1981, 83-90). (6) Viewing narrative as a structured world versus an enunciative actdistinguishes the approaches of a (structuralist) poetics from arhetoric of narrative. In the former, we make judgments about a world(e.g., in the narrative theories of Barthes and others, these judgmentsderive from cultural/biological codes that we possess). In the latter,we make judgments as listeners about speaking subjects. The former(baldly put) takes as its model "writing"; the latter takes asits model "speaking." According to a rhetoric of narrative, weunderstand meaning not as coded text but as "hi-fiperformance" (e.g., reading a text "aloud"). In thespeech act of reading, we understand and develop a speaker-listenerrelationship. The speaker speaks with an individual, personal voice. So we are now concerned not just with the what of a rhetoric ofnarrative, but also with the how. Our conception of a dynamicspeaker-listener relationship, with the speaker helping to shape thecommunicative act as the speaker adapts to the listener's ongoingreactions, directly raises the question of how rhetoric works, how itconvinces audiences. How indeed does rhetoric "move" or function? Anestablished definition of rhetoric is that it is "the function ofadjusting ideas to people and people to ideas" (Bryant 1953, 123).This process ranges on a continuum of poles between a completeaccommodation of speaker ideas to audience views ("telling peopleonly what they want to hear") at one extreme to total intransigence in��tran��si��gentalso in��tran��si��geant ?adj.Refusing to moderate a position, especially an extreme position; uncompromising.[French intransigeant, from Spanish intransigente : at the other ("my facts speak for themselves" or "myviewpoint is the only reasonable/moral/etc. one"). The would-beconvincing speaker, therefore, must always be adjusting his or her ideas(and self) to the listeners; the listeners are always "measuringthe speaker up," bending toward him or resisting him. He projects acertain image to them, and as his discourse proceeds, they reconsidertheir impressions of him, filling in the missing links of his argument,placing it within the context of their own experience and relating to relating torelate prep → concernantrelating torelate prep → bez��glich +gen, mit Bezug auf +accitin their own idiosyncratic id��i��o��syn��cra��sy?n. pl. id��i��o��syn��cra��sies1. A structural or behavioral characteristic peculiar to an individual or group.2. A physiological or temperamental peculiarity.3. way. V In The Rhetoric of Fiction, Wayne Booth addresses at length our"measuring up" of the speaker/narrator and our forming acertain "image" of him or her. Booth discusses this process asthe reader's construction of the author's "secondself" and terms this second self "the implied author The implied author is a concept of literary criticism developed in the twentieth century. It is distinct from the author and the narrator.The distinction from the author lies in that the implied author consists solely of what can be deduced from the work. ."The real author "creates not merely an ideal, impersonal 'manin general' but an implied version of himself that is differentfrom the implied authors we meet in other men's works." Theimplied author is a kind of "official scribe" and "thepicture the reader gets of this presence is one of the author'smost important effects" (1961, 71). (7) However impersonal theauthor may attempt to be, the reader will construct this picture, saysBooth. Chatman maintains, however, that Booth's implied author hasno real voice. "It instructs us silently, through the design of thewhole, by all the means it has chosen to let us learn" (1980, 180).Technically, this interpretation of Booth by Chatman is not quiteaccurate; for the implied author establishes norms in the narrative,with his chief method an often subtle use of tone. (8) It is true that the implied author has no clear voice, however, andthis stems from the fact that--despite Booth's avowedly rhetoricalorientation--his book conceives narrative as a fictional world, not as acommunicative act. The Rhetoric of Fiction principally discusses the useof fictional devices, with rhetoric conceived not primarily asargumentation but as technique or style. This accounts for Booth'srepeated preference for the novels of James and Austen over the realistEdwardian master Arnold Bennett Enoch Arnold Bennett (May 27, 1867 - March 27, 1931) was a British novelist. LifeBennett was born in a modest house in Hanley in the Potteries district of Staffordshire. (1961, 147). (9) A more appropriate term for works nearer to my "argument"pole than the "narrative" pole--works which construct not afictional world that the reader enters but a speaker-listenerrelationship (as in the essay)--is "the implied orator ORATOR, practice. A good man, skillful in speaking well, and who employs a perfect eloquence to defend causes either public or private. Dupin, Profession d'Avocat, tom. 1, p. 19.. 2. ." At aglance, this may seem a mere substitution of terms. But the"implied orator" actually functions very differently fromBooth's implied author, so that we do have a clear impression of aspeaking voice. In many novels, of course, Booth's "implied author"is indeed the proper term, for we have an "author" who doesseem to instruct us silently. We may be aware, but only dimly, of a mindarranging plot and evaluating characters, thereby crafting a fictionalworld. Yet in more didactic novels such as George Orwell's 1984, weare often aware of a presence arranging and evaluating ideas andcharacters in building a convincing argument. We as readers respond tothe arguments that the implied orator advances by proposition and symbolor motif; we care less about the characters' fates or developmentand more about how the characters figure in the narrative's centralargument. We care less about Winston Smith This article is about the character in Nineteen Eighty-Four. For other uses, see Winston Smith (disambiguation).6079 Winston Smith is a fictional character and the protagonist of George Orwell's 1949 novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. and Julia in 1984 than aboutwhere Oceania is headed, whether "The Brotherhood" exists,whether Goldstein and the underground can possibly launch a true revolt,and what the book (the bible of the revolutionary Brotherhood) contains. "Rhetorical" fiction such as 1984--political novels,utopias/dystopias, novels of ideas, philosophical novels, satire--seemsto most readers to "argue a case," however overtly orcovertly. (10) We see and hear an orator painting scenes and presentingexamples and propositions, whether or not the narrative is in the firstperson (as in Fielding's Tom Jones) or third person (Orwell's1984) point of view. This narrative priority of the implied orator forshaping convincing arguments (rather than richly, seamlessly texturedfictional worlds) accounts for what many critics deplore de��plore?tr.v. de��plored, de��plor��ing, de��plores1. To feel or express strong disapproval of; condemn: "Somehow we had to master events, not simply deplore them"in overtlyrhetorical fiction as "unsatisfying" character creation:novels "lacking" dynamic, three-dimensional characters. (Thisis typically regarded as a near-universal deficiency of utopian fictionsuch as More's Utopia, Huxley's Brave New World Brave New WorldAldous Huxley’s grim picture of the future, where scientific and social developments have turned life into a tragic travesty. [Br. Lit.: Magill I, 79]See : DystopiaBrave New World , and 1984.) The implied orator's focus on argument also provokes relatedobjections, e.g., including what many critics (such as Booth)unsympathetic to the novel of ideas deplore as "the author'sintrusive presence." Because the implied orator'sargumentative success hinges not only on the quality of his argument,but also both on the listeners' belief in his character and goodwill (the orator's ethos) and on their emotional response to him(pathos), he will necessarily seem (and be) much more immediate and"present" (Perelman 1971, 19). (11) His voice will sound moredirect and constant than that of the implied author. But this impliedorator is not the author--just as Booth's implied author is not.For we are dealing (in the case of prose fiction) with the act ofstory-telling, i.e., a speaking subject communicating his or her"fictional world of experience" to a listener."Narrative," or "story," connects speaker andlistener through telling. The crucial difference here from Booth's conception is thatthe implied orator is more (or at least substantially) concerned aboutthe structure of his argument than with the structure of his fictionalworld (insofar as we can make that distinction here). Of course, wemight claim that the most successful arguments are those fullyintegrated within rich fictional worlds, such as in the novels ofFielding, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy. But this would not necessarily betrue. For the effectiveness of rhetorical fiction depends on theadjusting of ideas to people and people to ideas. It might well be thecase that 1984 would be a much less effective argument against politicaltyranny and totalitarianism if Orwell had created a "richer"fictional world with "rounder," more fully realized charactersand a less heavily plotted narrative, or a less darkly textured setting. VI We might also consider these narrative issues from theaudience's standpoint. Whereas concepts such as the implied authorand the implied orator proceed from the standpoint of the storyteller,concepts such as Wolfgang Iser's implied reader conceive narrativeissues to proceed from the receiver. Like Booth, Iser pursues aphenomenological approach that posits a literary "world."Iser's implied reader confronts the literary text as structure andseeks to "bring to light" the work's subject matter inorder to "realize" the fictional world (Konkretisation). Iserconceives of a story as "something like an arena in which readerand author participate in a game of the imagination" (1978, xiii,xi). The scene for the implied orator and the implied auditor is moreproperly a courtroom. Here they interact as advocate and jury member,respectively. The jury (presumably pre��sum��a��ble?adj.That can be presumed or taken for granted; reasonable as a supposition: presumable causes of the disaster. less so than the judge) will be"convinced" not only by rational argument but also byemotional and ethical appeals. Instead of "realizing a world,"the implied auditor weighs appeals and then assents or rejects. Whereasthe implied reader's overriding task is to interpret a world and"take an active part in the composition of the novel'smeaning," the implied auditor's ambition is to evaluate a caseand (re-)actively shape the terms of the argument (Iser 1978, xiii).According to classical rhetoric, as an auditor listens to the numerousclaims made and propositions advanced by the rhetor rhe��tor?n.1. A teacher of rhetoric.2. An orator.[Middle English rether, from Latin rh (or orator), theauditor will determine what Cicero called statis, the central or turningpoint in a case (Cicero 1860, 119). He or she will decide whether theargument is to turn on a question of fact, definition, value, or qualityand then give or withhold his assent accordingly. Because we as implied auditors (in works closer to my argumentpole) are not called upon to "enter a world" so much as tostand apart and evaluate a (rationally based) argument, we may oftenfeel more detached from an overtly argumentative story. We feeldistanced, perhaps even alienated. Although the implied orator is"closer" to us than the implied author, we are also fullyaware of his presence. We may remain wary and on our guard. In suchcases, we do not yield ourselves (except when powerful, effectiveemotional and ethical appeals are used) quite so readily as we maysurrender to a new fictional world. Judging a story from the conceptionof "world" rather than "storytelling experience," wethus often conclude that we "couldn't get into the story"because "the author wanted to ram his ideas down [our]throat." Of course, many narratives may fail as rhetoric becausethey are too shrill and preachy; but viewing prose fiction from astandpoint closer to the argument pole, we evolve a different set ofreader expectations. We begin to ask (as we do in lectures or speeches),"What is he driving at? What is the point here?" We begin towonder about the progress and construction of the argument more thanabout the strict development of character and plot. Obviously, we will not be asking these questions about most prosefiction so impatiently or insistently as we do with lectures and essays.But the closer that fiction approaches the "argument" pole (asin satire), the greater our tendency to become "impliedauditors" intently listening to our "implied orator."Moreover, powerful non-rational appeals can virtually eliminateorator-auditor distance every bit as much as in fictional worlds enteredby implied readers. In these cases, the courtroom does approach thecharged atmosphere of the arena--for courtroom drama too can engage alistener body and soul, and in fact courtroom crises are understandablya frequent subject of tragedy and melodrama. The rhetorical situationand the mode of orator appeal will therefore determine the distance ofthe implied orator and auditor from each other. In general, the greaterthe distance perceived by the reader, the more the narrative approachesa rationally based argument. The foregoing discussion of the dialectical exchange between animplied orator and an implied auditor, each one of them framing andresponding to argument, serves as an introduction to the how of arhetoric of narrative, as in "How do stories convince people?"Or phrased more precisely, "How do implied orators convincelisteners through stories?" We have seen that the answer turns on the extent to which the"story" is rhetorical--i.e., on how extensively it"function[s] [by] adjusting ideas to people and people toideas." In a novel of ideas, the adjustments are quite extensive;in a formalist short story, much less so. Whereas the former moreresembles a speaker-listener relationship, the latter constructs a worldthat the reader enters. As we have discussed, numerous otherdistinctions enter via these dynamic concepts, all of which advancebeyond the what of narrative to the how. For instance, whereas our howof a rhetoric of narrative is exemplified by the formulations of impliedorator and implied auditor, our what of narrative merely identifiesnarrative as opposed to non-narrative. We are now equipped to take another long step towardconceptualizing our rhetoric of narrative. This step entails taking asharp turn away from contemporary narrative theory and toward classicalrhetoric, whereby we aim to enrich and inform our rhetoric of narrativewith relevant insights and distinctions from classical rhetoricaltheory. Both our how and what of a rhetoric of narration can be profitablyapproached through classical rhetoric's canons. (In fact, myadaptation of Iser's phenomenology phenomenology,modern school of philosophy founded by Edmund Husserl. Its influence extended throughout Europe and was particularly important to the early development of existentialism. of reading to characterize theauditor's experience, as well as my distinction of narrative fromargument in our opening remarks on the rhetoric of narrative, ismotivated by their correspondence to classical rhetoric's first twocanons.) As we shall see, an investigation of the relevance and value of thecanons of classical rhetoric to our prolegomena toward a rhetoric ofnarrative raises numerous complex, protracted issues. VII The five main divisions of ancient rhetoric from Aristotle throughQuintilian (and largely accepted by rhetorical scholars until theseventeenth century) were inventio (discovery and invention), dispositio(arrangement, adaptation), elocutio (style), memoria (memory), andpronunciatio (delivery). For the classical scholars, operating with arationally grounded view of rhetoric, the first two canons were of chiefimportance. We have previously discussed at length Wolfgang Iser's conceptof the "implied reader," remarking that Iser advances whatamounts to a "poetics" of narrative, rather than a"rhetoric" of narrative. Here we may note that several of hisobservations and concepts are nonetheless also applicable to a rhetoricof narrative. In fact, Iser's phenomenology of reading is directlypertinent to our classical rhetorical perspective toward narratology.Indeed Iser (perhaps inadvertently) incorporates into his poetics alanguage and orientation derived from the very first canon of classicalrhetoric. He writes: "Linking all these essays is one dominant, andit seems to me, central theme: discovery." Iser continues:"The reader discovers the meaning of the text, taking negation ashis starting point Noun 1. starting point - earliest limiting pointterminus a quocommencement, get-go, offset, outset, showtime, starting time, beginning, start, kickoff, first - the time at which something is supposed to begin; "they got an early start"; "she knew from the ; he discovers a new reality through a fiction which,at least in part, is different from the world he himself is used to; andhe discovers the deficiencies inherent in prevalent norms and in his ownrestricted behavior" (1978, xiii). Iser speaks of discovery as a "form of esthetic es��thet��icadj.Variant of aesthetic. pleasure," which temporarily "frees" the reader in thereading experience from his confines as a limited social being and"exercises" his cognitive and emotional faculties. Discoveryfor Iser is "a kind of esthetic blank" that is "filled indifferently" according to individuals' natures andsociohistorical conditions. From the standpoint of our rhetoric of narrative, discovery in theclassical canon may likewise be considered "a kind of rhetoricalblank." Although classical rhetoricians discussed this first canonas the orator's "method for finding arguments," we mayconsider discovery in connection both with implied orators and impliedauditors. We as readers do have a sense of an implied orator framing the"materials" of his fiction--character, plot, setting, andpoint of view--to bolster his argument. For the implied auditor, we mayadapt Iser's concept of discovery and observe that discovery as a"form of rhetorical appeal" liberates (temporarily) the readerfrom his established convictions and "exercises" his rational,emotional, and ethical faculties. According to Cicero, inventio meantthat a speaker would rely variously on native genius, on method or art,and/or on diligence to help him find suitable arguments. The rhetor(classical orator) who possessed a sharp intuitive sense for the properarguments was at a distinct advantage, but classical training ininventio also included a systematic method for locating arguments.Aristotle defined rhetoric as the "faculty of discovering in theparticular case" all "the available means" of convincingaudiences. Given the inevitable abundance of "means," areliable method of "locating" suitable arguments wasinvaluable. Once the ideas or arguments have been "discovered," thereremains the rhetor's task of selecting, marshaling, and organizingthem with a view to realizing the discourse's end: disposition. Ofcourse, the process of finding fit arguments is also a matter ofselection (the choosing of "materials") and apportionment The process by which legislative seats are distributed among units entitled to representation; determination of the number of representatives that a state, county, or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. The U.S. (assigning relative "weight" to materials). In one sense, bothinventio and dispositio take place before the oration commences. Theycomprise the "preview" period; in a second, "review"stage, the speaker invents and orders or adapts as the speech progressesaccording to his audience's responses. In any case, inventio anddispositio have understandably been discussed as a sort of rhetoricalversion of Siamese twins--they cannot really be separated--and we do sohere merely for heuristic A method of problem solving using exploration and trial and error methods. Heuristic program design provides a framework for solving the problem in contrast with a fixed set of rules (algorithmic) that cannot vary. 1. purposes. Dispositio, the second canon, is most pertinent to a theory ofnarrative. My decision to mark narrative as distinct from argument isnot arbitrary: classical scholars beginning with Aristotle consideredthe narratio and argumentum ar��gu��men��tum?n. pl. ar��gu��men��ta LogicAn argument, demonstration, or appeal to reason.[Latin arg to be the two essential parts of dispositio.Classical theorists worked primarily from the model of the forensic(courtroom) speech. Thus narratio was the statement of the case;argumentum was the "proof" of the case. As Aristotlemaintained in The Rhetoric: A speech has two parts. Necessarily, you state your case, and you prove it. Thus we cannot state a case and omit to prove it, or prove a case without first stating it.... In Rhetoric we must call these two processes, respectively, Statement and Argument.... The indispensable constituents are simply the statement and the ensuing Argument. (Aristotle 1932, 220) VIII The precise purpose of the narratio was to "indicate thenature of the subject on which he [the judge] will have to givejudgments" (Quintilian 1805, iv. 2. 1). In practice, it was notmerely informative but also suasory, "a speech in miniature"(Ragsdale 1966, 21). Quintilian advised that narratio function "notmerely to instruct but rather to persuade the judge" (1805, iv. 2.21). Forensic oratory was most appropriate to a statement of the factssince the province of courtroom speech is the past, but deliberative de��lib��er��a��tive?adj.1. Assembled or organized for deliberation or debate: a deliberative legislature.2. Characterized by or for use in deliberation or debate. andepideictic Ep`i`deic´tica. 1. Serving to show forth, explain, or exhibit; - applied by the Greeks to a kind of oratory, which, by full amplification, seeks to persuade.Adj. 1. (ceremonial) oratory also made use of reciting past events asa basis for recommendations about the future and present--and sonarratio also came by Quintilian's time to figure prominently innon-forensic discourse. Although the narratio is fundamentally informative, explaining tolisteners the circumstances that they need to understand about thesubject at hand, the manner of setting forth the facts would predispose pre��dis��posev.To make susceptible, as to a disease. the audience toward accepting or rejecting the following argument.Quintilian advised that the narratio be brief, plausible, and lucid.Quintilian insisted that "we must aim, perhaps everywhere, butabove all in our statement of facts, at striking the happy mean in ourlanguage" (1805, iv. 2. 45). Plausibility will result from theethical image and tone of the speaker. Lucidity is gained by what theGreeks called enargeia, which refers to the palpability or vividness inthe word-picture of a scene, and also to the liveliness and emotionalimpact generated in showing action (rather than merely telling whathappened). Great writers such as Orwell are often rhetorical as well asliterary masters who know how to present a compelling narratio. In 1984,Orwell's descriptive talents support the argumentative ends of hisanti-utopian novel. For instance, the following scene depicting Winstonand Julia's first liaison (at the Oceania show trials) is soskillfully rendered that we can imagine the prosecuting attorney for theThought Police entering it as state's evidence against them: They were standing in the shade of hazel bushes. The sunlight, filtering through innumerable leaves, was still hot on their faces. Winston looked out into the field beyond, and underwent a curious, slow shock of recognition. He knew it by sight. An old, close-bitten pasture, with a footpath wandering across it and a molehill here and there ... A thrush had alighted on a bough not five meters away, almost at the level of their faces.... It was in the sun, they in the shade.... He wondered whether after all there was a microphone hidden somewhere near. He and Julia had only spoken in low whispers, and it would pick up not what they said, but it would pick up the thrush. Perhaps at the other end of the instrument some small, beetle-like man was listening intently. But by degrees the flood of music drove all speculations out of his mind. It was as though it were a kind of liquid stuff that poured all over him and got mixed up with the sunlight that filtered through the leaves. He stopped thinking and merely felt. The girl's waist in the bend of his arm was soft and warm. He pulled her round so that they were breast to breast; her body seemed to melt into his. (Orwell 1961, 102-03) This vivid narration is not actually part of a prosecutingattorney's courtroom presentation for the Thought Police in 1984.Yet it well could be. There is no disputing the clarity andeffectiveness of such a tableau. Its effectiveness is heightened byabrupt contrast, i.e., by its emergence after more than one hundredpages describing the misery, bleakness, and sterility of Oceania,typified by this passage just two pages earlier: A long line of trucks with wooden-faced guards, armed with submachine guns standing upright in each corner, was passing slowly down the street. In the trucks little yellow men in shabby greenish uniforms were squatting, jammed close together. Their sad Mongolian faces gazed out over the sides of the trucks, utterly incurious.... Truckload after truckload of the sad faces passed. Winston knew they were there, but he saw them only intermittently. The girl's [Julia's] shoulder ... was pressed against his. (Orwell 1961, 96) Placed side by side, these two passages provide us as impliedauditors with a sense of an orator seeking to praise and blame, as inthe epideictic speech. The narratio as miniature speech, vividly spoken,indicts not Winston and Julia, but rather the society which makes themseek love surreptitiously sur��rep��ti��tious?adj.1. Obtained, done, or made by clandestine or stealthy means.2. Acting with or marked by stealth. See Synonyms at secret. . The first speech also could be enteredagainst the state; that is, it could properly be given by a prosecutorbringing charges against the government for bugging. Indeed it is thestate's outrageous violation of privacy and decency to which werespond in the first passage, especially after reading the second. Inthe second passage, although the implied orator is initially lookingthrough Winston's eyes, he then remarks that Winston "saw [theprisoners] only intermittently" and is preoccupied with Julia. Itis the implied orator who has kept his gaze fixed upon the truckloads ofsad faces--and kept our gaze and ears upon them as well. As narratio functions above, it serves not only to inform but alsoto convince. It employs four types of communication that rhetoricalhandbooks have traditionally distinguished: description (making verbalpictures), narration (telling stories), exposition (setting forthfacts), and argumentation ("applying" the facts). Of course,as we have seen, the types overlap; still, we may observe that ourgeneral category of "narration" more characteristically usesthe first two (as, for example, "narrating the story of mylife"), whereas argumentation is most directly concerned with thelatter pair, i.e., with what the Romans called confirmatio (proof) andrefutatio. IX The argumentum raises most directly the difficult task of orderingour points and reflects the contemporary view of disposition as"planned adaptation." The orator is faced with many questionsrelating to sequence and significance. Should I refute the other side orpresent my own arguments first? Should I begin with my weakest argumentsand build up to my strongest? The ancients usually advised thatrefutation ref��u��ta��tion? also re��fut��aln.1. The act of refuting.2. Something, such as an argument, that refutes someone or something.Noun 1. precede proof, and that one conclude with his strongestargument. But they stressed that no inflexible rules could be laid downdictating sequence and weight: the best strategy will vary according tothe audience and particular situation. Moreover, the ancients presumedthat the speaker possessed some relevant knowledge of the audience,based on shared doxa (opinion, public consensus) that establishedvarying degrees of communal norms. It is difficult to illustrate the arrangement and adaptation ofarguments in fiction simply by quoting short passages because the ideasproved and refuted are typically embedded in the fiction and developedover several pages or sections. Yet Orwell's 1984 does contain afew instances of short, enthymematic argument. We have said that theenthymeme as a method of suasion has the same relationship in rhetoricas does the syllogism as a method of proof in logic. Argument moves alsoby propositions, with ideas as its defining units. The chief differencebetween these two forms of reasoning, syllogistic syllogisticFormal analysis of the syllogism. Developed in its original form by Aristotle in his Prior Analytics c. 350 BC, syllogistic represents the earliest branch of formal logic. Syllogistic comprises two domains of investigation. versus enthymematic,is that the former is concerned with scientific truths and the latterwith probable knowledge. The ideas are usually presented in both (atleast formally) in three steps: major premise major premisen.The premise containing the major term in a syllogism.Noun 1. major premise - the premise of a syllogism that contains the major term (which is the predicate of the conclusion)major premiss , minor premise minor premisen.The premise in a syllogism containing the minor term, which will form the subject of the conclusion.Noun 1. , andconclusion. Consider the following instance of syllogistic reasoning. All men are mortal. (Major premise) Socrates is a man. (Minor premise) Socrates is mortal. (Conclusion) The degree of certainty is much stronger in this syllogism than inthe following enthymeme derived from a passage of 1984: Everybody is constantly watched in this society. (Major premise) I am a member of this society. (Minor premise) I am constantly watched. (Conclusion) The preceding enthymeme is extracted from the following passagefrom 1984: Outside, even through the shut windowpane, the world looked cold. Down in the street little eddies of wind were whirling dust and torn paper into spirals, and though the sun was shining and the sky a harsh blue, there seemed to be no color in anything except the posters that were plastered everywhere. The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding corner. There was one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said, while the dark eyes looked deep into Winston's own. Down at the street level another poster, torn at one corner, flapped fitfully in the wind, alternately covering and uncovering the single word INGSOC. In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows. The patrols did not matter, however. Only the Thought Police mattered. ... Any sound that Winston made would be picked up by the telescreen; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.... It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. (Orwell 1961, 6) Whereas the syllogism leads to a necessary conclusion fromuniversally true premises, the enthymeme leads only to tentativeconclusions (though often expressed as certainties) from probablepremises. In our example from 1984, though the conclusion drawn aboutlife in Oceania is highly probable, the degree of certainty we haveabout the major premise here is not complete. But if we accept the majorpremise, doubtless we will also accept the conclusion. The enthymeme is often discussed as a "truncatedsyllogism" because one of its premises may be missing yet isinvariably in��var��i��a��ble?adj.Not changing or subject to change; constant.in��vari��a��bil supplied by the audience (as with the missing element in anelliptical construction In the grammar of a sentence, an elliptical construction is a construction that lacks an element that is, nevertheless, recoverable or inferable from the context [1]. The elliptical construction is a sequence of words in which some words have been omitted. ). In other words Adv. 1. in other words - otherwise stated; "in other words, we are broke"put differently , one proposition is impliedrather than stated, and this proposition is often the enthymeme'svulnerable link. The following is an enthymeme derived from the above passage with asuppressed premise. "Only the Thought Police matter [are trulyterrifying] because they can see beyond physical windows into yourmind." Here we have an enthymeme, in the sense of both a truncatedsyllogism and a deductive de��duc��tive?adj.1. Of or based on deduction.2. Involving or using deduction in reasoning.de��duc argument based on probable premises. The truthof the minor premise here--"The Thought Police can see beyondwindows into your mind"--could be confirmed or refuted. Theprobable premise resides in the unexpressed proposition, "Onlyseeing into your mind, not privacy invasion, is truly terrifying."We all "know" (or believe, according to our culture'sshared doxa) that the latter proposition is not universally true. But wealso know that "mind control" or invasive psychologicalmethods (what we might term "psycho-invasion") are trulyterrifying. It is, in other words, probable by comparison that, in a worldwhere eavesdropping Secretly gaining unauthorized access to confidential communications. Examples include listening to radio transmissions or using laser interferometers to reconstitute conversations by reflecting laser beams off windows that are vibrating in synchrony to the sound in the room. and a lack of physical privacy are the norm, stateinvasion of the mind is the final, terrifying prospect. Indeed, in aruthlessly totalitarian state Noun 1. totalitarian state - a government that subordinates the individual to the state and strictly controls all aspects of life by coercive measurestotalitation regime , the prospect of maintaining an intactmind (i.e., a "house of Being" free from intrusion) is theonly form of personal privacy, and therefore the only terrifyinginvasion, that remains. For all practical purposes, that probability issufficient to convince us at the novel's end that the Ministry ofLove and Room 101 must contain some utterly inconceivable and inhumane in��hu��mane?adj.Lacking pity or compassion.inhu��manely adv. means of mental torture and control. (12) To sum up: we have seen how argument "moves": it isadvanced by a progression of ideas ordered in an enthymematic chain.This chain may serve either to prove or refute. Thus, thenarrative's development is shaped not so much by the necessities ofplot and character as it is bound to rational suasion. X In outlining the how of a rhetoric of narrative, we have addressedthe two dimensions of narrative as enunciative act: the dynamics of bothnarrative as "telling" (a communication between an impliedorator and implied auditors) and of narrative as "story" (itsfictional "world," with argument advanced by connectedconcepts in enthymematic chains). This how is based upon a distinctionof narrative from argument, with the former primarily informational andcharacterized by a sequence of events. The how is based on the what,comparable in spirit to Seymour Chatman's positing (in his classicStory and Discourse) of a what ("story") and a "way"("discourse"). Thus far I have been concerned chiefly with two aims: first,marking narrative from argument, rather than from description ornon-sense (or from another non-narrative mode); and second, discussingthe nature and process of argument. Our inquiry has advanced beyond the"lower-order" levels of language that I addressed at lengthearlier: grammar and logic. But I should stress here too that those twolevels of language are integral components of a rhetoric of narrative.Correctness (grammar) and meaning (logic) are indispensable to anysuccessful rational appeal. Ideas developed through poor usage, or whichare incoherent or trivial, will not convince. Just as logic and grammarare dependent on rhetoric for their functional expression, a rationalrhetoric depends on logic and grammar to achieve its aim: assent. I have been careful so far to phrase my questions about the how ofnarrative using the words "argument," "convince,""rational appeal" and "assent." My emphasis has beenon rhetoric as "argumentative speech" and on the classicalview of rhetoric as rationally based argument. I have avoided until nowthe important corollary question, "How do stories persuadeus?" Although the question at first glance may seem identical to theones asked throughout about narrative, rhetorical scholars historicallyhave clearly distinguished "convincing" from"persuading," argumentation from persuasion. They havegenerally followed the distinction established in classical rhetoric andbest articulated by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason: "If ajudgment is valid for every rational being,... it is termed aconviction. If ... t has its ground in the particular character of thesubject, it is termed a persuasion" (1929, 138). (13) Kant goesfurther than some rhetorical theorists in making the distinction betweenconviction and persuasion turn on "objective" versus"subjective" judgment. But it is clear that convictionemphasizes rational acceptance, while persuasion does not necessarily doso. The distinction is rarely precise. Similarly, argumentation may bedistinguished as discourse that aims at delayed, critical acceptance ofa proposition, after an examination of the supporting proofs; persuasionaspires to a more immediate and less critical adoption of theadvocate's conclusions. Argument follows a logical pattern;persuasion may follow rational, emotional, or ethical patterns. "Hepersuaded but did not convince me" is a way of saying that one wasconfronted with "proofs" compelling to his heart or emotions,but not to his head or reason. (Logos is only one of Aristotle's"artistic proofs," which also consist of ethos and pathos.) Yet the question "How do stories persuade us?" is acorollary of the earlier questions only in the sense that it is a morecomplex inquiry that is best approached after suggesting the contours ofa rationally based theory of rhetoric as argument. In truth, just asargument is but a single (rational) type of persuasion, my originalquestions about stories as arguments are in fact corollaries to thislarger question of narrative as persuasion. Because of the complexity ofpersuasion and the relatively clear-cut distinctions between a poeticsof narrative versus a rhetoric of narrative (as argument), it has seemedto me wiser to begin with the comparatively sharp differences betweennarrative and argument. Yet the question of narrative as persuasion also opens us to a muchbroader range of narratives and raises even more intriguing questionsthan the foregoing. For it seems likely that not all narrativesargue--not all of them advance logical appeals. Certainly not alladvance rational arguments that may be formulated in enthymematicchains. Still, it might be said that all stories, at least in a weaksense, persuade us (or at least a few readers) of something. For even ifwe consider a story on the model of a "fictional world" ratherthan a speaker-listener exchange, we as readers enter a world that isanimated by values. Whether we grant or withhold assent, whether we are"moved" to embrace the story's Weltanschauung or not, wenevertheless confront that world's axiology axiologyor value theoryPhilosophical theory of value. Axiology is the study of value, or goodness, in its widest sense. The distinction is commonly made between intrinsic and extrinsic value—i.e. when we enter it--justas surely as we do when we enter a different culture. XI My primary aim here is not to insist that all narratives persuade,only that an approach to narrative as persuasion (rather than argument)takes us beyond the range of so-called didactic literature. We arecapable in this new formulation of dealing with stories more distantfrom my argument or "speaker-listener" pole and closer to mynarrative or "fictional world" pole. Of course, the polesthemselves have actually shifted: "narrative" is nowdistinguished not from "argument" but from"persuasion." This change reflects contemporarytheorists' broadened view of rhetoric: from the classical view ofrhetoric as rationally based to a psychological conception of rhetoricas "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperationin beings that by nature respond to symbols" (Burke 1969, 261-62). In this reformulation, a rhetoric of narrative would have thesymbol as its defining unit, with the image and "ideograph"(14) as its constituents. Whereas the enthymeme serves as the instrumentto advance the argument, motifs would be the instruments of persuasivenarrative. Ideas would be bound up in developing motifs, but the ideasthemselves would not be the units of the persuasive chain. These unitswould be images, often concentrated and shaped as symbols, or patternedas motifs. As with the enthymematic chain, the motif chain would becomparatively loose and more difficult to mark than grammar's"event" chain or logic's syllogistic chain. A mixed conception of a rhetoric of narrative as persuasion wouldbe based on a distinction between a sequence of events (as in argument)and a sequence of images or symbols. With the overarching distinctionresulting as narration versus persuasion, narration (followingBurke's psychological definition of rhetoric) would now be reducedto a much smaller scope than when it is opposed to argument. If wefollowed Burke's near-cosmic conception of rhetoric, we wouldarrive close to our distinction in the realm of logic between narrativeand non-sense, with the latter simply lacking in meaning. For as Burkeputs it in A Rhetoric of Motives, "Wherever there is persuasion,there is rhetoric. And wherever there is 'meaning,' there is'persuasion.'" He explains that food, eaten and digested,is not rhetorical. Yet "in the meaning of food there is muchrhetoric, the meaning being persuasive enough for the idea of food to beused as a rhetorical device Noun 1. rhetorical device - a use of language that creates a literary effect (but often without regard for literal significance)rhetoric - study of the technique and rules for using language effectively (especially in public speaking) of statesmen" (1969, 261-62). This last claim is hard to dispute. But do we want to expandrhetoric and persuasion to the entire field of human activity andinteraction--and restrict narrative virtually to meaninglessness ornon-sense? I do not. Rather, I conceive images and symbols as persuasion(or rhetoric) only when they are embedded in and connected to our motifchain of verbal discourse. (15) (For the purposes of this essay, I amconsidering "stories" as verbal discourse.) XII Let us reformulate Verb 1. reformulate - formulate or develop again, of an improved theory or hypothesisredevelopformulate, explicate, develop - elaborate, as of theories and hypotheses; "Could you develop the ideas in your thesis" our main question and approach it from adifferent angle: How do stories persuade us? How do they"move"--and move us? The short answer: by analogies. If grammatical movement in narrative can be characterized primarilyas temporal, and logical and argumentative movement as logical, we maycharacterize persuasive movement as primarily ana-logical (Gk."according to" some "ratio" or comparative"relation") and psycho-logical (Gk. a spirit-relation, i.e., aconnection perceived by the imagination). As the narrative weaves imagesand moves from motif to motif, it appeals primarily to the reader'simagination, not to his reason. Another way of positing thisdistinction, as exemplified in Burke's Philosophy as Literary Form,is that, whereas classical, rationally based narratio in theAristotelian sense argues, a psychologically based rhetoric fostersauthor-reader (-auditor) identification through aesthetic form. Burke addresses the "business of interpretation" in thelanguage of classical rhetoric, calling it "argument [orpersuasion, actually] by analogy". We persuade by means ofover-simplification and "analogical an��a��log��i��cal?adj.Of, expressing, composed of, or based on an analogy: the analogical use of a metaphor.an extension": "Weoversimplify o��ver��sim��pli��fy?v. o��ver��sim��pli��fied, o��ver��sim��pli��fy��ing, o��ver��sim��pli��fiesv.tr.To simplify to the point of causing misrepresentation, misconception, or error.v.intr. a given event when we characterize it from the standpointof a given interest--and we attempt to invent a similar characterizationfor other events by analogy" (1975, 105-07). (16) The pattern ofextension involves adding some device or aspect from an unrelatedcontext to the situation at hand, as when, accustomed to walking onlevel ground, we "invent" a forward swing of our hands forwalking uphill. However, the experienced sailor, having learned toshipwalk by taking the rhythms of the sea into account, may"roll" when on firm ground. Our extensions may either enableor handicap us. As with enthymematic chains, it is difficult to illustrate motifchains in short passages from stories. But most readers find that 1984addresses them more in the spirit of persuasion than as an argument, asI have distinguished them here. Orwell makes less use of logos than ofethos and pathos. Charged phrases dominate the novel: "BigBrother," "WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY, IGNORANCE ISSTRENGTH," "Thought Police," "Enemy of thePeople," "The Brotherhood," "The Book,""Room 101," "Miniluv," and so on. These and otherwords possess a hypnotic power that pervades the narrative. Severalnotable analogical extensions occur as Winston brings elements from thereader's world into the world of 1984, whereby Winston finds indismay that the extensions do not apply--though indeed the impliedorator uses them to good persuasive effect. For instance, Winston hears the prole prole?n.A proletarian: "If there is hope . . . it lies in the proles"George Orwell. woman singing a maudlin maud��lin?adj.Effusively or tearfully sentimental: "displayed an almost maudlin concern for the welfare of animals"Aldous Huxley.See Synonyms at sentimental. jingle about the past and thereupon there��up��on?adv.1. Concerning that matter; upon that.2. Directly following that; forthwith.3. In consequence of that; therefore. develops a "mysticalreverence" for her. He fantasizes that she is singing especiallyfor him and for Julia, and he sees the singer as the incarnation of aproletarian spirit that "would stay alive against all the odds,like birds, passing on from body to body the vitality that the Party didnot share and could not kill." From here, Winston'sassociations pass on to birds themselves. He imagines that the thrush thrush, in medicinethrush,in medicine, infection caused by the fungus Candida albicans, manifested by white, slightly raised patches on the mucous membrane of the tongue, mouth, and throat. which he and Julia heard on their first afternoon of love-making"sang to us." Julia replies: "He wasn't singing tous.... He was singing to please himself. Not even that. He was justsinging." (1961, 182) She is right. Yet so accustomed is Winston to the carefullyorchestrated "Two-Minute Hate" sessions chanted to BigBrother, and to the vapid state hymns intoned by half-drunk Partymembers under strict supervision in local bars, that he can onlyconceive of Verb 1. conceive of - form a mental image of something that is not present or that is not the case; "Can you conceive of him as the president?"envisage, ideate, imagine singing as performed for an audience and with a rational(even propagandistic) purpose. Unmediated Adj. 1. unmediated - having no intervening persons, agents, conditions; "in direct sunlight"; "in direct contact with the voters"; "direct exposure to the disease"; "a direct link"; "the direct cause of the accident"; "direct vote"direct desire and raw instinct havebeen purged from his view of the proles PROLES. Progeny, such issue as proceeds from a lawful marriage; and, in its enlarged sense, it signifies any children. by his social experience, which,analogically an��a��log��i��cal?adj.Of, expressing, composed of, or based on an analogy: the analogical use of a metaphor.an "chained out," has become what Veblen called a"trained incapacity The absence of legal ability, competence, or qualifications.An individual incapacitated by infancy, for example, does not have the legal ability to enter into certain types of agreements, such as marriage or contracts. ." This incapacity is rendered even more apparent by thenarrative's analogizing between Oceania's clocks and"Newspeak newspeakofficial speech of Oceania; language of contradictions. [Br. Lit.: 1984]See : HypocrisyNewspeak - A language inspired by Scratchpad.[J.K. Foderaro. "The Design of a Language for Algebraic Computation", Ph.D. Thesis, UC Berkeley, 1983]. " language with our own. The clock in Winston andJulia's hideaway above Mr. Charrington's shop is a pre-Oceaniaantique, whose face is not marked according to military time. Whereasall Oceania public events, news bulletins, and official Party activitiesare announced or scheduled by military time (and indeed the novel openswith the clocks "striking thirteen"), this is not the case inthe utopian world of the bedroom above Charrington's shop. In thislovers' hideaway with its antique clock, the time never goes beyondtwelve. Winston's habit of marking time by Oceania standards,however, apparently causes him to confuse 9 a.m. with 9 p.m., and thecouple accidentally sleeps through the night and thus misses work thenext morning, a technical slip-up that leads to their capture by theThought Police. Here again, Winston's trained incapacity--viewingthe world of the room in Charrington's shop by the standards ofOceania (he had also been standing in the bedroom looking outside on theprole woman singing) causes him to confuse the two worlds. The implied orator thus persuades us powerfully of the oppressivenature of a world literally run on military time where the clocks seemto us readers fixed on thirteen--and where people can be convicted ofThoughtcrime. Of course, this term itself is part of Oceania Newspeak,which Winston can expertly manipulate (and takes pride in his capacityto do so). Oceania is run on words like doublethink, duckspeak, INGSOC INGSOC English Socialism (From Orwell's 1984),Minitro, Pornosec, and facecrime. "The Revolution will be completewhen the language is perfect," one of Winston's coworkers,Syme, declares to him. Yet Winston, despite his proficiency in Newspeak,is deceived into regarding O'Brien and Charrington as honest men,largely because they know so much about the past, particularly theOldspeak words of his childhood nursery rhymes. His facility withNewspeak blinds him to the duplicitous characters of these ThoughtPolice agents. Once again, it is a matter of analogy between our worldand the world of 1984, and we as readers--unlike Winston'scolleague Syme--see in Newspeak the impoverishment and manipulation oflanguage, not the beauty of its "rigid definition," pristineeconomy, and greater "self-discipline," in Orwell'ssatiric description. The point here is that we can trace how images and words thatintertwine and pattern carry some clear theme, idea, or dominantimpression threaded through a narrative or a section of it--in this caseimages and words such as "singing," "clock," andparticular language motifs. These images and words may or may not bedirectly "analogous" to the reader's familiar experience.Nonetheless, the reader will draw some conclusion about the narrative aspersuasive act by comparing its world with his own. This fact broadens our concept of the implied orator and auditor,for it expands the range of appeals that the orator uses--to persuade,not necessarily to argue rationally. It also alters the nature of theauditor's response and the paradigmatic See paradigm. "scene" of ourcommunicative act. The scene is no longer the courtroom. Now it somewhatapproaches the scene posited in Wolfgang Iser's study, The Act ofReading, which we discussed earlier: the "arena." But we arestill far from his poetics of narrative and his literary aesthetics. Astory that is a communicative act of persuasion remains chiefly arhetorical narrative. It bears affinities with Iser's"arena," though it is by no means quite like a "playingfield of the imagination." Rather, it seems closer to the hustings(i.e., the campaign trail) where candidates typically put an emphasis onethical and emotional appeals over rational appeals, though they alsoinclude the latter. (17) XIII Are stories arguments? Are narratives persuasive discourses? Sometimes. If they progress primarily by conceptual chains or bymotifs carrying ideas, we may posit, enthymematically, a tentative"yes." But as with the interrelation of inventio anddispositio, and with the dynamic, dialectical character of thecommunicative act, the what of narrative is not a separate question fromthe how. We must constantly be attentive as to how narratives move if weare to distinguish the modes within them accurately. Only then will we become aware of how they are moving us. Notes (1) See, for instance: Chatman; Genette 1983, 1986; Todorov;Barthes; Prince 1982, 1987; Ricoeur; and Bal. (2) The work of Walter R. Fisher, however, whose scholarshipaddresses rhetorical theory and narrative aesthetics, has been chieflyconcerned with axiological ax��i��ol��o��gy?n.The study of the nature of values and value judgments.[Greek axios, worth; see ag- in Indo-European roots + -logy. rather than grammatical issues. According toFisher, the "stories" that people tell somehow reflect theirown personal values, and the receiver takes into account his or herpersonal beliefs when evaluating the message as believable or credible.Fisher believes that we are basically "storytelling animals"who take complicated information and make stories out of it. Allmeaningful communication is a form of storytelling. Human beingsexperience and comprehend life as a series of ongoing narratives, eachwith its own conflicts, characters, beginnings, middles, and ends. ForFisher, the way in which people explain and/or justify their behavior,whether past or future, has more to do with telling a credible storythan it does with producing evidence or constructing a logical argument.Fisher proposes narrative rationality and coherence (fidelity andprobability) as an a priori a prioriIn epistemology, knowledge that is independent of all particular experiences, as opposed to a posteriori (or empirical) knowledge, which derives from experience. , therby serving as basis upon which todistinguish good and bad stories. But he argues that human communicationis more than its rational form: its cultural context and the values ofthe audience are equally important. See, for instance, Fisher (1984,1989, 1994). (3) Frye's "Rhetorical Criticism Rhetorical criticism is an approach to criticism which is at least as old as Aristotle. Rhetorical criticism studies the use of words and phrases (in the case of visual rhetoric, also visuals) to explicate how arguments have been built to drive home a certain point the author or " chapter discussesgenre theory as a relation between poet and audience. (4) Fisher's theory of "narrative paradigm The Narrative Paradigm is a theory proposed by Walter Fisher that all meaningful communication is a form of storytelling or to give a report of events (see narrative) and so human beings experience and comprehend life as a series of ongoing narratives, each with their own " advancesa different perspective on these issues, especially via his concepts ofnarrative probability and narrative fidelity. See, for example, Fisher(1989, chapters 1-3). (5) Although Barthes' theoretical discourse is complex andresists any condensed summary, its chief relevance to my immediateargument lies in his analytic modes for reading fiction. In S/Z (1970),he posited five codes or voices for analyzing the meanings andsignificance of fiction, which he proceeded to apply in his literaryexegesis exegesisScholarly interpretation of religious texts, using linguistic, historical, and other methods. In Judaism and Christianity, it has been used extensively in the study of the Bible. Textual criticism tries to establish the accuracy of biblical texts. of Balzac's Sarrasine. The best literary texts possess aplurality of meanings and invite a variety of interpretations activelycreated by attentive readers. Barthes' five codes include theempiric (plot, story development), the hermeneutic her��me��neu��tic? also her��me��neu��ti��caladj.Interpretive; explanatory.[Greek herm (interpretive"puzzles," suspense, tensions), the connotative (connotations,taut/implicit elements), the referential (readers' general socialknowledge, the cultural literacy Cultural literacy is the ability to converse fluently in the idioms, allusions and informal content which creates and constitutes a dominant culture. From being familiar with street signs to knowing historical reference to understanding the most recent slang, literacy demands of the audience), and symbolic (binaryopposites). These codes interact and overlap both to generate anddisclose the text's diverse meanings. Of course, the paradigm ofnarrative as fictional world need not be approached by way of astructuralist poetics (as I have tried to demonstrate in this essay).But the most prominent approaches have been from French structuralism structuralism,theory that uses culturally interconnected signs to reconstruct systems of relationships rather than studying isolated, material things in themselves. This method found wide use from the early 20th cent. .Even Iser's and Booth's avowedly "rhetorical"approaches are forms of stylistic poetics, i.e., rhetoric as"style" rather than in its broader sense as persuasion orargument. (6) Langellier attempts here to locate a phenomenology of narrativewithin a structuralist poetics by situating the "narratingperson" in the fiction's "lived-world" (of"narration"). This perspective is further developed inLangellier and Peterson. (7) See also Booth (1988). (8) For another, more recent revisionist re��vi��sion��ism?n.1. Advocacy of the revision of an accepted, usually long-standing view, theory, or doctrine, especially a revision of historical events and movements.2. engagement withBooth's concepts, see Levitt, especially his chapter "TheFallacy of the Implied Author." Also the critique by Hix. (9) In his Rhetoric of Modernist Fiction, Levitt concentrates hiscritique of Booth on this limitation in The Rhetoric of Fiction.According to Levitt, the strength of Booth's classic study lies inhis revealing readings of traditional novels, but his work (despitesubsequent revisions) seems outdated to many readers, given that he doesnot seriously grapple with modernist and post-modernist fiction. Levittdiscusses how fictions (and metafictions) reject narrative omniscience OmniscienceEashrewd god; knew everything in advance. [Babylonian Myth.: Gilgamesh]Godknows all: past, present, and future. ,objectivity, and even authorial presence, as he analyzes works rangingfrom Joyce, Mann, and Woolf to Don DeLillo Don DeLillo (born November 20 1936) is an American author best known for his novels, which paint detailed portraits of American life in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. He currently lives in New York City. , John Barth Noun 1. John Barth - United States novelist (born in 1930)John Simmons Barth, Barth , Carlos Fuentes Noun 1. Carlos Fuentes - Mexican novelist (born in 1928)Fuentes ,detective novels, and comic strips. (10) By contrast, Barthes' "zero-degree" writingstands as a polar opposite that which is conspicuously different in most important respects.See also: Opposite , representing a literary form far removedfrom narrative argument. (11) See Perelman's informed discussion of the ethics ofrhetoric throughout the opening chapter of The New Rhetoric. (12) For an excellent analysis of Winston Smith as a"political rhetor," see Bitzer 1985, 83-94. Bitzer'sconclusion to his essay confirms the appropriateness of treatingOrwell's 1984 as a touchstone for our investigation into therelation between rhetoric and narrative: "Orwell joins rhetoricaltheorists, from Plato and Aristotle to Perelman and Burke, who tookpains to conceive a rhetoric suited to tendencies toward tyranny." Edwin Black has also briefly addressed the concept of an impliedauditor via his coinage, "the second persona," which treatsthe relationship between a discourse and the audience that responds toit. Black notes that it "does not focus on a relationship between adiscourse and an actual auditor. It focuses instead on the discoursealone, and extracts from it the audience it implies." Allrhetorical discourses imply an auditor, and "in most cases theimplication will be sufficiently suggestive as to enable the critic tolink this implied auditor to an ideology." See Black. (13) See also Perelman (1971, 23). (14) The term is Michael McGee's. It refers to a charged wordor phrase to which we respond automatically and habitually, as in ourreaction to a red stop light. McGee contends that words such as"Communism," "Liberty," "Equality," andothers have at various times in American history, at least in certainsubcultures, triggered this response. See McGee (1979, 1-16). (15) See Bryant for a well-argued view of rhetoric's limitsand scope as verbal discourse. (16) More recent scholars have developed related concepts that bearon our application of Burkean "analogical extension." For waysin which narrative has been used as a "rhetoric ofpossibility," in the phrase of some rhetorical scholars, seePoulakos; Kirkwood. Also relevant to our discussion is how narrativesget rhetorically "reconstructed." See, for example, Charland. (17) The term hustings (from the Middle English Middle EnglishVernacular spoken and written in England c. 1100–1500, the descendant of Old English and the ancestor of Modern English. It can be divided into three periods: Early, Central, and Late. , "court ofcommon pleas COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. The name of an English court which was established on the breaking up of the aula regis, for the determination of pleas merely civil. It was at first ambulatory, but was afterwards located. ") refers traditionally to the public platform on whichcandidates for the British parliament Noun 1. British Parliament - the British legislative bodyBritish House of Commons, House of Commons - the lower house of the British parliamentBritish House of Lords, House of Lords - the upper house of the British parliament formerly stood to address theelectors. 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