Korzybski and Bateson: paradoxes in 'consciousness of abstracting'.

Korzybski and Bateson: paradoxes in 'consciousness of abstracting'. ALFRED KORZYBSKI Noun 1. Alfred Korzybski - United States semanticist (born in Poland) (1879-1950)Alfred Habdank Skarbek Korzybski, Korzybski maintained that training in "consciousness ofabstracting" would lead people beyond the paradoxes of abstraction.Gregory Bateson Gregory Bateson (9 May 1904 – 4 July 1980) was a British anthropologist, social scientist, linguist, and cyberneticist whose work intersected that of many other fields. , on the other hand, argued for the inability to achievethis thoroughly. He writes, "Korzybski was, on the whole, speakingas a philosopher, attempting to persuade people to discipline theirmanner of thinking. But he could not win. When we come to apply hisdictum to the natural history of human mental process, the matter is notso simple." (1979, pp.30-31) This point can be brought out moregenerally, where Bateson suggests, We do not, any of us, achieve rigor. In writing, sometimes, we can take time to check the looseness of thought; but in speaking, hardly ever ... I know that I personally, when speaking in conversation and even in lecturing, depart from the epistemology outlined in the previous chapter; and indeed the chapter itself was hard to write without continual lapses into other ways of thinking and may still contain such lapses. I know that I would not like to be held scientifically responsible for many loose spoken sentences that I have uttered in conversation with scientific colleagues. But I also know that if another person had the task of studying my ways of thought, he would do well to study my loosely spoken words rather than my writing. (1968, p.230) Finally, toward the end of his career Bateson concluded that,"It seems to be a universal feature of human perception, a featureof the underpinning of human epistemology, that the perceiver shallperceive only the product of his perceiving act. He shall not perceivethe means by which that product was created." (Bateson, 1977,p.238) I will not, as if by fiat and pronouncement, take sides on thisissue. Rather, I here attempt to explicitly walk through a series ofillustrations that help bring out how the "logic or method" ofKorzybski remains correct but the conclusion of Bateson should not beunderestimated. I try to demonstrate that we, in our warnings andsuggestions regarding the troubles with abstraction, inevitably make thevery kinds of mistakes that we attempt to extirpate. Even if we desire to speak about entities which are "notyet" classified (such as the concepts of "the unspeakablelevel" or perhaps "the infinity of 'things' not yettalked about"), we so easily forget how we already (i.e., therein)have classified them. (1) I apologize for my utter literalism lit��er��al��ism?n.1. Adherence to the explicit sense of a given text or doctrine.2. Literal portrayal; realism.lit here, butI would like you to carefully examine the previous sentence. Inparticular, the words "entities" and "things," tothe extent that they make reference, refer to what are already within aclass. This means that if we say what something is called rather than"is," we might thereby conclude that it is not yet classified.Syntax is such that it enables us to forget that we already have calledit "something" and also "thing." And even there, inthat previous sentence, we seemed likewise to forget that we called thething "it." And there it was called "thing." Acrossthese few simple sentences, we hop from one word to another, obliviouslytaking some to be labels for things while taking others to be not morelabels; it is as if we make reference to what we then pretend wedidn't talk about. Consider an even more direct and immediate manner of explaining theterm "abstraction." I could stand before people, hold a cup ofcoffee in my hand, and then state that the thing I am holding anddrinking from is not a "cup." "'Cup,'" Ifurther say, "is the English word we use to refer to thisthing." Then, silently tapping the cup and dramatically wrapping myhands around it, I say, "This, what I now am holding in my hands,is not a 'cup,'; 'cup' is word, a kind of mapping,that enables us to categorize things, in this case what I amholding." What is critical is that although my silent actionaccompanies my words, the words themselves actually increase inabstraction: The word "cup" is labeled as an abstraction whilesimultaneously the word "thing" seemed to be used as if itwere the less abstract term. By syntactical combination, integratingdifferent levels of abstraction though an overlapping reference, weproduce utterances in which we seem to talk about what would beindependent of our talk about it; higher abstractions are thus taken asif they were the "thing" more directly. These paradoxes of abstraction occur because we conflate con��flate?tr.v. con��flat��ed, con��flat��ing, con��flates1. To bring together; meld or fuse: "The problems [with the biopic]include . . thedifference in logical type between abstract words (e.g.,"things," "entities," "objects") andmetalanguage A language used to describe another language. 1. metalanguage - [theorem proving] A language in which proofs are manipulated and tactics are programmed, as opposed to the logic itself (the "object language"). or words that explicitly refer to the verbal order (e.g.,"speech," "language," "words"). Althoughnon-metalinguistic words (abstract words) can posit that their referentspreceded the words we used to refer to them, we are able to do so onlybecause of syntax: Terms such as "language,""words," "speech," or even "verbal level,"when syntactically combined with abstract words such as"object" or "thing," operate as a mode of"overlapping reference" (cf. Holenstein, 1976). They functionas a "code to message" reflexivity that allows us to makesense of the claim that "objects" and "things"preceded the words by which we refer to them. Hence, metalinguistic met��a��lin��guis��tic?adj.Of or relating to a metalanguage or to metalinguistics.meta��lin��guis references enable a reflexivity that becomes taken-for-granted in theclaim that "things came before language." By the very syntaxof our utterances, we say that things precede language, and, this doesmake sense, but only because we have used metalinguistic references andthereby already have referred to the verbal order. The roots of such difficulties can also be found where we attemptto thoroughly separate a class from its name. If we confuse a class withits name, we obviously suffer from logical-typing errors. But thequestion remains: is it even possible for this to be thoroughly avoided?Doesn't an unnamed category seem not to be a category at all? What,that is, would an unnamed category be a category of? Perhaps a more illustrative example would help: Common sensesuggests that actual physical apples must have preceded the abstractclass of apples, and yet, if we do not yet have the class of apples,then how could any one apple be counted as an apple? As Lee Thayer(1997) suggests, the difficulty is that "To have one of anything,we already must have a category." (p.75) Thayer's point isthat individual entities do not precede the categories by which we classthem. Take, as one more example, Bateson's opening remarksregarding the problem of "play." Bateson (1956) states,"We live in a universe of namables. Within that universe we makeclasses." (p.145) This is certainly clear enough, but could thenamables come before the classes? Is it not obvious that the namablesare already within a class, the class of namables? At this point, a critic still might try to argue that language isnot needed for the existence of kinds or classes of things. 'It isonly for our convenience, it merely aids us in labeling naturallyoccurring types,' the critic might argue. The critic may furtherstate: "It does not matter what you call the thing. Whether youcall something a 'cup,' a 'drinking vessel,' or an'object,' the thing is still here." This does seem tomake sense at least initially. And yet, as I have tried to show inseveral ways, we have not made good sense as much as we have enabledourselves to overlook our non-sense. It is worth recalling that when theWhite Knight White Knightfalls off his horse every time it stops. [Br. Lit.: Lewis Carroll Through the Looking-Glass]See : AwkwardnessWhite Knightinvents clever objects that never work. [Br. Lit. meets Alice, in Through the Looking Glass Looking Glass - A desktop manager for Unix from Visix. , he tries tocheer her up by playing some music. But first he states, 'The name of the song is called "Haddock Eyes."' 'Oh, that's the name of the song is it?' Alice said, trying to feel interested. 'No, you don't understand,' the Knight said, looking a little vexed. 'That's what the name is called. The name really is "The Aged Aged Man."' 'Then I ought to have said "That's what the song is called"?' Alice corrected herself. 'No, you oughtn't: that is quite another thing! The song is called "Ways and Means": but that's only what it's called, you know!' 'Well, what is the song, then?' said Alice, who was by this time completely bewildered. 'I was coming to that,' the Knight said. 'The song really is "A Sitting On A Gate": and the tune's my own invention.' It appears that Alice eventually got to the bottom of all this(also cf. Wilden, 1978), but did she? Could the song be 'A SittingOn A Gate'? Is this not a kind of erroneous identification, asubtle act of taking the words for the thing? Do we now know the songrather its title? More critically asked: what does the White Knight meanby "the tune"? My inquiry focuses not upon what the name ofthe tune is called, nor what the tune is called, nor even is it anattempt to know the name of the tune. I would like to know how I know(or why I seem to think) that the tune is the song. And, end of the day,I would like to know (i.e., to be able to "re-produce," evenif only partly and in memory) the actual song. The textual imbroglio im��bro��glio?n. pl. im��bro��glios1. a. A difficult or intricate situation; an entanglement.b. A confused or complicated disagreement.2. A confused heap; a tangle. we find in Carroll's humorous taleforces our attention to what Bateson called the "premiseintransitivity in��tran��si��tive?adj. Abbr. intr. or int. or i.Designating a verb or verb construction that does not require or cannot take a direct object, as snow or sleep.n.An intransitive verb. " that characterizes naturally communicative frames.Bateson (1955) argues, "It is conventional to argue that if A isgreater than B, and B is greater than C, then A is greater than C. Butpsychological processes do not obey the transitivity tran��si��tive?adj.1. Abbr. trans. or tr. or t. Grammar Expressing an action carried from the subject to the object; requiring a direct object to complete meaning. Used of a verb or verb construction. of asymmetricalrelations. Proposition P may be a premise for Q; Q may be a premise forR, and R may be a premise for P." (p.185) Our everyday talkhabitually hops around and between various abstract words and, in doingso, we leave such intransitivity covered over. Thus, when Batesonsuggests that he has a "desire to know about those processeswhereby organisms pull themselves up by their bootstraps" (1956,p.216), he turns our attention to the ways that communicationsyntactically imbricates intransitive in��tran��si��tive?adj. Abbr. intr. or int. or i.Designating a verb or verb construction that does not require or cannot take a direct object, as snow or sleep.n.An intransitive verb. yet asymmetrical distinctions andthus in-builds different layers of abstraction. Now, obviously, Korzybski's Science and Sanity (1933)discusses at length the non-identification between "words" andthe "un-speakable objective level," and he succinctlysummarizes his ideas with the pithy pith��y?adj. pith��i��er, pith��i��est1. Precisely meaningful; forceful and brief: a pithy comment.2. Consisting of or resembling pith. one-liner: "Whatever one mightsay something 'is,' it is not" (p.409). In this veryquotation Korzybski's actual utterance goes against his insights ashe states them. By the syntax of the utterance he implies that the words"something" and "it" are not already something said.Korzybski undoubtedly would defend himself and say that this exactly ishis point, as he sums it up elsewhere: "It is evident that everytime we mistake the object for the event we are making a serious error,and if we further mistake the label for the object, and therefore forthe event, our errors become more serious" (Korzybski, 1949,p.245). Here we again find the same difficulties: he uses the words"object" and "event" to state his insights andthereby is forced to use the very resources that he calls into question. We cannot propose a non-identification--nor call identificationinto question--without subtly embodying the errors that we wish tochallenge. Regarding the paradoxes of abstraction, we thus continue tomake the mistakes--and thereby to illustrate--the very difficulties thatwe attempt to bring under critical attention. NOTE 1. This point is nicely brought to head by Alan Watts Alan Wilson Watts (January 6, 1915 – November 16, 1973) was a philosopher, writer, speaker, and expert in comparative religion. He was best known as an interpreter and popularizer of Asian philosophies for a Western audience. , who comparesKorzybski's views with Zen Buddhism Zen Buddhism,Buddhist sect of China and Japan. The name of the sect (Chin. Ch'an, Jap. Zen) derives from the Sanskrit dhyana [meditation]. . Watts writes, "However,it would seem that Korzybski still thought of the'unspeakable' world as a multiplicity of infinitelydifferentiated events. For Zen, the world of 'suchness' isneither one nor many, neither uniform nor undifferentiated undifferentiated/un��dif��fer��en��ti��at��ed/ (un-dif?er-en��she-at-ed) anaplastic. un��dif��fer��en��ti��at��edadj.Having no special structure or function; primitive; embryonic. ... it teasesthe mind out of thought, dumfounding adj. 1. same as dumbfounding.Adj. 1. dumfounding - bewildering or striking dumb with wonderastounding, dumbfoundingincredible, unbelievable - beyond belief or understanding; "at incredible speed"; "the book's plot is simply incredible" the chatter of definition."(pp. 130-131) This issue is taken up also by Walker Percy Noun 1. Walker Percy - United States writer whose novels explored human alienation (1916-1990)Percy (1954). REFERENCES Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York New York, state, United StatesNew York,Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of ,NY: Bantam BantamFormer city and sultanate, Java. It was located at the western end of Java between the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the early 16th century it became a powerful Muslim sultanate, which extended its control over parts of Sumatra and Borneo. Books. Bateson, G. (1977). "Afterword," In About Bateson. (Ed.,J. Brockman). New York, NY: E.P. Dutton. Bateson, G. (1968). "Information and Codification The collection and systematic arrangement, usually by subject, of the laws of a state or country, or the statutory provisions, rules, and regulations that govern a specific area or subject of law or practice. : APhilosophical Approach," in Gregory Bateson and Jurgen RueschCommunication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry. New York, NY: W.W.Norton & Company. Bateson, G. (1956). "The Message, 'This isPlay'" In Group Processes. (Ed., B. Schaffner). New York:Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation. Bateson, G. (1955). "A Theory of Play and Fantasy: A Report onthe Theoretical Aspects of the Project for Study of the Role ofParadoxes of Abstraction in Communication." Approaches to the Studyof Human Personality. American Psychiatric Association The American Psychiatric Association (APA) is the main professional organization of psychiatrists and trainee psychiatrists in the United States, and the most influential world-wide. Its some 148,000 members are mainly American but some are international. . PsychiatricResearch Reports, no 2. Reprinted in 1972 as "A Theory of Play andFantasy," In Steps to an Ecology of Mind Steps to an Ecology of Mind is a collection of Gregory Bateson's short works over his long and varied career. Subject matter includes essays on anthropology, cybernetics, psychiatry and epistemology. It was originally published by Chandler Publishing Company in 1972. . New York, NY: BallantineBooks. Holenstein, E. (1976). Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language:Phenomenological Structuralism structuralism,theory that uses culturally interconnected signs to reconstruct systems of relationships rather than studying isolated, material things in themselves. This method found wide use from the early 20th cent. . (Trans. C. Schelbert & T.Schelbert.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press Indiana University Press, also known as IU Press, is a publishing house at Indiana University that engages in academic publishing, specializing in the humanities and social sciences. It was founded in 1950. Its headquarters are located in Bloomington, Indiana. . Korzybski A. (1933). Science and Sanity: An Introduction toNon-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics gen��er��al semantics?n. (used with a sing. verb)A discipline developed by Alfred Korzybski that proposes to improve human behavioral responses through a more critical use of words and symbols. . Lakeville, CT. TheInternational Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company. Korzybski, A. (1949). "Fate and Freedom" in The Languageof Wisdom and Folly: Background Readings in Semantics. (Ed., I. Lee).New York: Harper and Row Publishers. Percy, W. (1954). The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man is, HowQueer Language is, and What one has to do with the Other. New York:Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Thayer, L. (1997). Pieces: Toward a Revisioning ofCommunication/Life. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Press. Watts, A. (1957). The Way of Zen. New York: Vantage Books. Wilden, A. (1987). The Rules are No Game. New York: Routledge &Kegan Paul. COREY ANTON* * Corey Anton is the author of Selfhood self��hood?n.1. The state of having a distinct identity; individuality.2. The fully developed self; an achieved personality.3. and Authenticity (SUNY SUNY - State University of New York press, 2001), which received the Erving Goffman Erving Goffman (June 11, 1922 – November 19, 1982), was a sociologist and writer. The 73rd president of American Sociological Association, Goffman's greatest contribution to social theory is his study of symbolic interaction in the form of dramaturgical perspective that Award by the MediaEcology Media Ecology is an interdisciplinary field of media theory involving the study of media environments. According to the Media Ecology Association [1], media ecology can be defined as "the study of media environments, the idea that technology and techniques, modes of Association. He is an associate professor in the School ofCommunications at Grand Valley State University, Allendale MI. A muchlarger and modified version of this paper is to be included in TheAmerican Journal of Semiotics semioticsor semiology,discipline deriving from the American logician C. S. Peirce and the French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. It has come to mean generally the study of any cultural product (e.g., a text) as a formal system of signs. as part of the Bateson Centennial. Thelarger piece is called, "Playing with Bateson: Denotation de��no��ta��tion?n.1. The act of denoting; indication.2. Something, such as a sign or symbol, that denotes.3. Something signified or referred to; a particular meaning of a symbol.4. , LogicalTypes, and Analog and Digital Communication."