Kant and the illusion of collective security.

Kant and the illusion of collective security. Observing the destructive impact of the seventeenth centuryEuropean wars of religion, Thomas Hobbes concluded that man by himselfis incapable of preserving peace and order. He assumed that peace couldonly be established if a strong monopoly of violence was created in thehands of a single sovereign. In essence, his idea was simple: If man isaggressive by nature, no peace is possible without an ultimate authority- the Leviathan - capable of enforcing order. Hobbes's conclusion has hardly been challenged by otherpolitical philosophers This is a list of political philosophers, including some who may be better known for their work in other areas of philosophy. Note, however, that the list is for people who are principally philosophers. . Even Locke, who proposed a moderate version ofgovernment to create domestic peace, agreed with Hobbes in two basicassumptions: first, no civil society can be built without a supremeauthority, tribunals to render verdicts and police authorized to enforcesuch verdicts; second, given the existence of sovereign states, theprocess of centralization cen��tral��ize?v. cen��tral��ized, cen��tral��iz��ing, cen��tral��iz��esv.tr.1. To draw into or toward a center; consolidate.2. of power cannot be reproduced in theinternational sphere. States would never agree to relinquish theirpowers to an almighty, universal sovereign. Supporting this philosophical analysis Philosophical analysis is a general term for techniques typically used by philosophers in the analytic tradition that involve "breaking down" (i.e. analyzing) philosophical issues. is the bloody record ofpolitical conflict since Hobbes's time: While domestic order andpeace are possible, international war is seemingly inevitable. Yet evenin the face of clearly justified pessimism about the possibility ofinterntional peace, one cannot avoid returning to the question of whichinstruments, if any, can eradicate war as an instrument of policy amongnations. In the eighteenth century, the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kantmade the revolutionary argument that peace is possible even in theabsence of an international authority. According to according toprep.1. As stated or indicated by; on the authority of: according to historians.2. In keeping with: according to instructions.3. Kant, no universalLeviathan was necessary; rather, a large federation of committed statescould promote and maintain international peace. Though appealing,Kant's federation project was never seen as feasible until theearly years of the twentieth century. Only in the wake of the First World War, which discredited the ideathat peace can be preserved under a mere balance-of-power system, was itpossible to contemplate the reform of political relations among states.There is a profound similarity between Kant's ideals and theinternational collective security systems created in the twentiethcentury. The League of Nations and its heir, the United Nations, wereboth based on the assumption that some kind of internationalorganization must be created if war is to be avoided or at leastlimited. Unlike Kant's project, however, contemporary collectivesecurity systems rely on the assumption that war can only be preventedif a coalition of states agrees to halt individual state aggression byforce if necessary. This solution poses a serious problem: How effectiveand desirable is the achievement of international peace by force? As theend of the Cold War brings renewed hopes for realizing a U.N. mechanismfor collective security, a discussion of this issue is crucial. In this article, I attempt to demonstrate that the contemporaryconcept of collective security not only impedes the creation of aworking international security system but also - and more importantly -contradicts the very ideal of international peace. To provide the readerwith an analytical context for my discussion of collective security, Ibegin with an analysis of Kant's project of perpetual peace Perpetual peace refers to a state of affairs where peace is permanently established over a certain area (ideally, the whole world - see world peace).Many would-be world conquerors have promised that their rule would enforce perpetual peace. incomparison with other theories of collective security. I then outlinethe main features of collective security organizations and discuss theirweaknesses. Relying on Kant's insights and reflecting on thelessons of the Gulf War, I conclude with the argument that theenforcement of peace, no matter how drastic the recent changes in theworld order, remains a self-defeating goal. Kant and the Problem of Peace With the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia Noun 1. Peace of Westphalia - the peace treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648 in 1648, Europeansovereigns put an end to the wars of religion, making the use of forcebetween states a political affair. Each state was recognized as anindependent part of the nascent European order, endowed with a sovereignjus ad bellum Jus ad bellum (Latin for "Justice to War"; see also Just War Theory) are a set of criteria that are consulted before engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is justifiable. , regardless of moral grounds. In this respect, the newsystem, later called the European balance of power, implied someprogress; it eliminated the devastating Christian notion of justwar" that demanded the destruction of religiously definedopponents. The establishment of European international law introducedthe mutual recognition of states as adversaries within a common order inwhich war between nations - by virtue of their absolute sovereignty -was from the outset a bellum justum.(3) In the eighteenth century, however, it became apparent to manyphilosophers that this ready acceptance of war stood as a stumblingblock stum��bling blockn.An obstacle or impediment.stumbling blockNounany obstacle that prevents something from taking place or progressingNoun 1. to the cultural and economic development of Europe. Thinkers suchas Abbe Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham attemptedto devise various schemes to realize what they called, ratherenthusiastically, an "everlasting" or "perpetual"peace. In this vein, the most celebrated work of that time was,undoubtedly, Kant's pamphlet, Perpetual Peace, published inKonigsberg in late 1795.(4) Kant's work has been properly depicted as a subtle andbalanced alternative to the optimistic perspective of Saint-Pierre andthe pessimistic view of Rousseau about the problem of achievinginternational peace.(5) The core of Kant's argument was thequestion of the feasibility of a federation capable of enforcing peace,and the conditions necessary to create this federation. In A Project for Perpetual Peace, Saint-Pierre suggested that onlya permanent and strong federation could maintain the rule of law amongnations.(6) He had envisioned a grand alliance of the Christian princesand kings of Europe through which they would renounce war, establishprocedures for arbitrating disputes and maintain a common police force.According to Saint-Pierre, the European states should agree on fourbasic requirements: 1 . The states should create an executive body, the so-calledSenate of Peace, composed of delegates from the 24 Christian states ofEurope. 2. Each state must provide the revenue necessary to support aninternational army. 3. In case of a dispute between two states, the states in conflictmust seek reconciliation through a mandatory mediation of the members ofthe grand alliance. In the event of failure, they must submit thecontroversy to the final arbitration of the Senate of Peace. 4. In the event that a state refuses to consent to the decision ofthe alliance or the Senate, an international army must be used to forcethe compliance.(7) Saint-Pierre's project was indeed an attempt to create a sortof European government, independent of and superior to the individualstates. In order to make the system work, each state would renounce theright to manage its international disputes and even abandon themaintenance of national armies. As the reader may guess, the main problem with this project was thedifficulty in persuading ambitious princes that they would benefit fromthe establishment of a sovereign federation. Saint-Pierre'sresponse was rather naive: He assumed that the princes would agree tocreate the system upon becoming aware of "the immense advantageswhich a perfectly certain peace would bring to them and to their RoyalHouses This is a list of regnant and non-regnant Princely, Royal and Imperial Houses of the World. The names of reigning monarchs are in bold text. Names used if the individual were reigning are given if known, otherwise the name given is the name currently used for them. ."(8) No prince, however, took Saint-Pierre'srecommendations seriously. Rousseau, who prepared an extract and summary ofSaint-Pierre's project, considered the work to be an excellenttheoretical approach to peace, but too unrealistic to be put intopractice. Like Saint-Pierre, Rousseau regarded war as a major evil andas the main obstacle to the progress of political and social reforms inEurope. He also believed that a strong federation of European states wasthe only way to end international war. Yet in contrast to Saint-Pierre,Rousseau thought that war was simply too profitable for kings andprinces to abandon so easily. Kings, he claimed, "are concernedwith two objects alone: to extend their rule abroad or to make it moreabsolute at home."(9) Although the idea of a federation committedto maintaining peace seemed the best approach to eliminating war,Rousseau saw no real possibility that European states would submit tofederal rule. He thus abandoned the problem as unsolvable. When Kant undertook the task of writing his political essay on theproblem of peace, he was mindful not only of Saint-Pierre's ideals,but also Rousseau's sober waming. Kant, however, took a muchbroader approach - going beyond the mere analysis of the instrumentsnecessary for attaining international peace. Along with Hobbes, Kantaccepted the pessimistic assumption that "the state of peace amongmen living side by side is not the natural state; the natural state isone of war."(10) From this perspective, the state of peace can onlybe an artificial and conscious creation of men. This reasoning, inKant's view, is valid for domestic as well as international peace.The fact that international peace does not exist in reality, Kantasserted, is not an argument for its impossibility. Rather,international peace is a necessary option dictated by the same moralimperative A moral imperative is a principle originating inside a person's mind that compels that person to act. It is a kind of categorical imperative, as defined by Immanuel Kant. Kant took the imperative to be a dictate of pure reason, in its practical aspect. that led men to associate in a political community in orderto overcome the unbearable state of civil war. In outlining a plan for perpetual peace, Kant distinguished betweennecessary and sufficient conditions This article discusses only the formal meanings of necessary and sufficient. For the causal'' meanings see causation. In logic, the words necessity and sufficiency refer to the implicational relationships between statements. . Among the former, Kant proposedthat an international order could only be created if three requirementswere met: First, states freely restrict their right to make war orinterfere in another's internal affairs Internal affairs may refer to: Internal affairs of a sovereign state. Internal affairs (law enforcement), a division of a law enforcement agency which investigates cases of lawbreaking by members of that agency through a treaty of mutualnon-aggression; second, an effective and progressive dismantling ofnational armies is undertaken; and third, states renounce the right towage punitive wars against other sovereign states.(11) The preliminary articles of peace clearly indicate Kant'sabsolute rejection of any kind of war of aggression Waging a war of aggression is a crime under customary international law and refers to any war not out of self-defense or sanctioned by Article 51 of the UN Charter. . Kant'sdeparture from the Christian doctrine of bellum justum deserves specialattention: He believed that the requirement of a justa causa to givemoral justification to the use of force was particularly dangerous whenapplied to offensive wars. Kant believed that peace could not beattained until statesmen abandoned the idea of just wars that entitle aparty to wage a punitive war against a wrongdoer.(12) In those cases,violence could reach such an extreme that an enduring peace settlementwould become almost impossible. The wars of religion had proven toEuropeans that "appeals to moral conscience would not only fail tohelp put an end to conflict, but would rather, despite an theparticipants acting in good faith, perpetuate and exacerbateit."(13) In formulating his alternative to the bellum justum doctrine, Kantrefused to accept the then-prevailing idea that legalizing all kinds ofwars would facilitate the progress to peace.(14) His contention wasdirected particularly against Emerich de Vattel Emer(Emmerich) de Vattel (April 25, 1714 - December 28, 1767) was a Swiss philosopher, diplomat, and legal expert whose theories laid the foundation of modern international law and political philosophy. , the classicrepresentative of eighteenth-century international law. According toVattel, because war is an inescapable fact of political life, andbecause there is no international authority, each state remains investedwith a sovereign jus ad bellum. For Vattel, the best international lawcan do is provide a specific set of rules to moderate and limit the useof force among nations; war must be transformed into a "guerre enforme forme(form) pl. formes ? [Fr.] form.forme fruste? (froost) pl. formes frustes ? an atypical, especially a mild or incomplete, form, as of a disease. " (formal war), conducted "independamment de la justicede la cause" (disregarding the justice of the cause).(15) Underthis definition of war, states - by virtue of their mutual recognitionas sovereign entities in a common political order - would agree toobserve certain limits in the conduct and termination of hostilities. Kant denounced this view as illusory, arguing that a peaceful andlawful international order can start only if nations agree to renounceany kind of war of aggression. The only wars Kant accepted as legal weredefensive wars by voluntary national militia.(16) This is consistentwith the idea that war, though abandoned in principle, could not beimmediately eradicated from international relations international relations,study of the relations among states and other political and economic units in the international system. Particular areas of study within the field of international relations include diplomacy and diplomatic history, international law, . Until the longprocess of establishing perpetual peace was completed, war would have tobe maintained as a legitimate defense. In combination with the necessary conditions for perpetual peace,Kant proposed three "definitive" articles of peace, arguably ar��gu��a��ble?adj.1. Open to argument: an arguable question, still unresolved.2. That can be argued plausibly; defensible in argument: three arguable points of law. his most important contribution to the philosophy of internationallaw.(17) They were: first, the establishment of a republicanconstitution for all states; second, the constitution of a union ofnations; and third, the creation of a cosmopolitan law, under which eachindividual becomes a citizen of the world. Despite the importance of thethird article, this essay is limited to my analysis of the first andsecond, which are most directly related to the essential problems ofcollective security.(18) By "republic," Kant meant a non-despotic form ofgovernment in which executive power is separated from legislative, andwhere the sovereign rules under a body of law to which the citizenry hasconsented. A republican constitution, in turn, is a juridical Pertaining to the administration of justice or to the office of a judge.A juridical act is one that conforms to the laws and the rules of court. A juridical day is one on which the courts are in session. JURIDICAL. form ofstate based on three principles: the freedom of all members of societyas men; the dependence of all upon a single common legislation assubjects; and the equality of all as citizens.(19) Kant relied heavilyupon the idea that European wars were mainly motivated by the greed ofgovernments and statesmen rather than that of peoples. His assumptionwas that "if the consent of the citizens is required in order todecide that war should be declared ... nothing is more natural than thatthey would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeingfor themselves all the calamities of war."(20) Like Saint-Pierre, Kant's idea may be criticized for beingnaive. More than once, history has shown that peoples can be asbellicose bel��li��cose?adj.Warlike in manner or temperament; pugnacious. See Synonyms at belligerent.[Middle English, from Latin bellic as their leaders, if not more so. The relationship between therepublican principle and peace, however, is not mechanical. Rather, Kantenvisioned a political order in which the citizenry (through publicscrutiny of governmental action) would become increasingly aware oftheir government's real motives in going to war, as well as thesacrifices they would face were the nation to engage in hostilities. Inthis sense, the existence of a republican constitution is not aguarantee of peace per se; rather, it is only a form of government thatrenders less likely the initiation of offensive wars for the purpose ofadvancing the ruler's political ambitions. The establishment of a federal system, the core of Kant'sproposal, is the most controversial aspect of his project. For Kant,states - like individuals - must abandon the state of nature if theydesire peaceful coexistence Peaceful coexistence was a theory developed during the Cold War among Communist states that they could peacefully coexist with capitalist states. This was in contrast to theories, such as those implied by some interpretations of antagonistic contradiction, that Communism and . A new order should then be based on acompact in which states agree to end all wars by proclaiming a foedumpacificum (league of peace). This league or union of nations, however,does not involve the creation of a single authority, as found in a civilconstitution.(21) As Norberto Bobbio Norberto Bobbio (October 18, 1909 – January 9, 2004) was an Italian philosopher of law and political sciences and an historian of political thought. He also wrote regularly for the Turin-based daily La Stampa. indicates, Kant did not propose apactum subiectionis, in which the states would submit their rights to acommon power, but rather a simple pactum societatis, a pact ofcollaboration among states.(22) In other words Adv. 1. in other words - otherwise stated; "in other words, we are broke"put differently , the efficacy of the pactof peace does not hinge on Verb 1. hinge on - be contingent on; "The outcomes rides on the results of the election"; "Your grade will depends on your homework"depend on, depend upon, devolve on, hinge upon, turn on, ride the existence of a coercive power aboveindividual states. For this reason, the alliance could be more properlydescibed as a confederation of free and independent states, rather thana federal state.(23) At the same time, Kant also rejected the idea of a league withexecutive bodies entitled to enforce peace by means of coercion againstaggressor AGGRESSOR, crim. law. He who begins, a quarrel or dispute, either by threatening or striking another. No man may strike another because he has threatened, or in consequence of the use of any words. states. "This league," says Kant, "does nottend to any domination over the power of the state but only to themaintenance and security of the freedom of the state itself and of otherstates in the league with it, without there being any need for them tosubmit to civil laws and their compulsion, as men in state of naturemust submit."(14) Kant foresaw that if the federation were tobecome so strong as to enforce peace against aggressor states, it couldbecome a super-state, inevitably overriding the rights of its members. Kant rejected the idea of such a Leviathan enforcing peace forthree major reasons. First, he feared that enforcement of peace througha world-state or a federal union might lead to the establishment of adespotic peace. For Kant, even the temporary preservation of the stateof war - the existence of independent states - "is rationallypreferable to the amalgamation of states under one superior power, asthis would be in one universal monarchy."(25) Second, since theenforcement of peace assumes that force can only be deterred by force,it would provide a rationale for future wars. This possibilitycontradicts Kant's preliminary articles of peace, in the sense thatno reservation for future wars was included in his treaty of mutualnon-aggression; he thus rejected the justification of a Wilsonian"war to end all wars." Third, the possibility of resorting towars of common defense against an aggressor might lead to therestoration of the doctrine of bellum justum. This problem is notexplicitly developed by Kant, but follows his arguments against the useof punitive wars in his new international order. Kant's projectprecludes such wars, regardless of whether they are waged by a singlestate, or by a coalition of states. At this point, the skeptical question is inevitable: What, ifanything, in Kant's project guarantees the maintenance of peace? The strength of the alliance lies in its capacity to extend - amonga greater number of states - the instruments of peaceful settlement ofdisputes, the principles of cosmopolitan law and the commitment tonon-aggression. Only by free and non-coercive consensus, when mankindbecomes aware of the benefits of the rational imperative of peace andrespect for the law, does Kant think his federation will becomeuniversal and effective. In other words, because of Kant's refusalto guarantee peace through the use of force, there are no"teeth" in his alliance for the prevention of war. Theguarantee, instead, rests on his moral doctrine, and more precisely, inhis philosophy of history. Peace is for Kant a moral duty which, as such, cannot beimposed.(26) As an imperative of the practical reason, the achievementof a peaceful coexistence is what Kant calls a "regulativeidea" - a rational end of action that man must adopt as a maxim ofbehavior, independent of its possibility of realization.(27) This meansthat man must act as though perpetual peace were attainable and attemptto create the essential conditions for its attainment: a republicanconstitution in every state and a league of peace comprised ofindependent and free nations. Further, Kant makes the historical argument that the human race hasexperienced constant progress toward the gradual development of reasonand liberty." In his view, the pervasiveness of war and violencehave been not only compatible with that development, but also the verysource of its realization. There is a "hidden purpose" innature, says Kant, "to produce harmony among men, against theirwill and indeed through their discord."(29) Simply put, Kantsuggests that it is only through the growing antipathy to war thatmankind will realize the necessity of an everlasting peace. This processwill be long and uncertain, but must not be imposed. Two centuries after Kant, mankind is probably more pessimisticabout the likelihood of this final development of history. The followingdiscussion of twentieth-century collective security systems indicatestheir mixed results in preserving the peace. Concepts of Collective Security Various projects of peace, based on philosophy and political theoryand focusing on the idea of a federation or a confederation of powers,have been proposed since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Theircommon characteristic: None was ever implemented. Only on rare occasionsdid politicians and statesmen even seriously consider these projects.The inescapable reality of the international system in the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries was the balance of power, in which each statewas invested with an equal right to resort to war; any idea of aninternational organization for maintaining peace was regarded asutopian. Early in the twentieth century, the outbreak of the First WorldWar, the emergence of nationalism and the crisis of the capitalistsystems all challenged conventional notions about the problem of war.Philosophers and statesmen alike became aware that some reforms werenecessary in the international system. As usually happens in a deepcrisis, strong pessimism was mixed with renewed optimism. "After1914," E.H. Carr has said, "men's minds naturally fumbledtheir way back, in search of a new utopia The Principality of New Utopia[] is a micronation project established and operated by Lazarus Long (a.k.a. Howard Turney).[1]The project was publicised by various media outlets in Europe and the United States. In an article about fake nations, Quatloos. ."(30) The "newutopia," in Carr's terms, was the desire of Western statesmantoward the end of the First World War to revive ideas aboutinternational peace offered by the earlier philosophers. This effort waschampioned by the U.S. president, Woodrow Wilson, who proposed that somemethod of international cooperation was needed to maintain internationalpeace and prevent future wars. "Mere agreements," said Wilson: ... may not make peace secure; it will be absolutely necessary thatforce be created as a guarantor of the permanence of the settlement somuch greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliancehitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination ofnations could face or withstand.(31) In other words, the new model for peace must be "not abalance-of-power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, butan organized common peace."(32) Collective security, as opposed tobalance of power, became the first principle of the new order. Wilson's concept of collective security was, however, poorlydeveloped on theoretical grounds. His energies were directed toward itsimplementation in the League of Nations. Perhaps the most simple andall-encompassing definition of collective security was that given by SirAlfred Zimmern as "the safety of all by all."(33) This implieda profound reform of the international legal system, upon which balanceof power was based. On the one hand, only defensive wars - by individualstates or coalitions - were admitted as legitimate wars under acollective security agreement; states would have to renounce the jus adbellum they enjoyed under existing European international law. On theother, the creation of an international organization would be essentialto setting up the international collaboration mechanisms to prevent warsand, eventually, suppress aggression.(34) Three conditions are essential for this type of system. First,states must renounce the possibility of resorting to coercive actions inabsence of international authorization. Except in the case ofaggression, in which self-defense must be admitted, states must submittheir conflicts to the peaceful settlement of disputes provided by theinternational organization. The use of coercive instruments, in turn,can only be approved by the international authority. Second, and in clear opposition to the idea of balance of power,the idea of collective security demands that states have no allianceswith or against other powers. Collective security requires the defenseof all against all. The "abstractness" of the enemy, as InisClaude notes, "is a leading characteristic of collectivesecurity."(35) The third condition is structural. Under a collective securitysystem, it is crucial to define the mechanisms by which a multinationalcoalition can be mobilized in case of aggression. Such a coalition forceis necessary to serve as a real deterrent to any aggressor. Thisimplies, in turn, that there is some international executive body,capable of commanding support from the states, that will organize anddirect the international force. Wilson's version of collective security shares some traitswith the Kantian project: the commitment of states to maintaining peaceon behalf of the global community, the creation of an international lawabove both domestic law and the national interests of the states and thepreservation of sovereign states in a confederated internationalorganization. Both ideas also share the assumption that there is astrong link between peace and the existence of governments based onpopular consent. Wilson, like Kant, believed that world peace could onlybe established through an alliance of democratically governed nations. Nonetheless, an important difference separates the two projects.Unlike Kant's project, but perhaps similar to Saint-Pierre'sideal, Wilson's concept of collective security assumes that nopeace is possible if the union of states does not have an effectivesystem of collaboration for the enforcement of peace. In this respect,the Wilsonian project addresses the problem that Kant left unsolved: theeffective prevention of wars of aggression up to the uncertain momentwhen states freely abandon that instrument. This remedy, as thefollowing discussion will show, also created new problems. The League of Nations and the United Nations as Collective Security Systems The idea that balance of power is a natural system for preservingpeace among nations contains at least a partial truth. In theory, abalance-of-power system requires only armies and diplomacy, theperennial instruments of foreign policy. In contrast, a collectivesecurity system must be created, and requires an internationalorganization capable of organizing cooperation among the states for themaintenance of peace. The first effort to establish such a system was made after theFirst World War, with the creation of the League of Nations. As aninternational organization, the League was neither a superstate superstateNouna large state, esp. one created from a federation of states nor asimple alliance of the victorious powers. It was, instead, an"instrument of co-operation," open to any state, under anorganizational model similar to a confederation of states.(36) Thecommitment to international peace beyond the national interest of thestates was estabhshed in the Covenant of the League by declaring that"any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of themembers of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern tothe whole League" (Article 11). Even imperfectly, the League Covenant provided some of theinstruments for the irnplementation of a collective security system. Oneessential state o bligation was "to respect and preserve asagainst external aggression the territorial integrity Territorial integrity is the principle under international law that nation-states should not attempt to promote secessionist movements or to promote border changes in other nation-states. Conversely it states that border changes imposed by force are acts of aggression. and existingpolitical independence of all members of the League" (Article 10).In this sense, if not overtly stated, the new legal order assumed theprohibition of aggression and the obligation of assistance to thevictims of aggression.(37) But the prohibition of war was not absolute.According to Article 12, in case of conflict, states should submit thematter to arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council ofthe League - its executive decision-making body. If no solution wereachieved after three months, however, a literal interpretation Noun 1. literal interpretation - an interpretation based on the exact wordinginterpretation - an explanation that results from interpreting something; "the report included his interpretation of the forensic evidence" of thearticle allowed the disputants to resort to force. The League was considered an international instrument open to anystate regardless of the nature and ideology of its government. Wilsonlikely intended, however, to refuse admission to authoritarian andnon-democratic regimes. The reference in Article 1 to any fully"self-governing" state becoming a member of the League wasinterpreted to support such exclusions by many commentators, even thoughin practice it was understood as a requirement of sovereignty, not ofdemocracy.(38) The core of the system created by the Covenant was Article 16.According to this provision, if any League member or non-member-statewere to resort to war in violation of the sections of peacefulsettlement of disputes (Articles 12,13 and 15), its actions should beregarded ipso facto [Latin, By the fact itself; by the mere fact.] ipso facto(ip-soh-fact-toe) prep. Latin for "by the fact itself." An expression more popular with comedians imitating lawyers than with lawyers themselves. as an act of war against all members of the League.The collective sanctions entailed in responding to such aggression couldrange from economic blockade to military actions ordered by the Councilof the League. No provision was made, however, to determine how thestates would collaborate to give effect to these sanctions. The gap between this system and Wilson's concept of collectivesecurity emerged in relation to the problem of the enforcement ofcollective security measures Noun 1. security measures - measures taken as a precaution against theft or espionage or sabotage etc.; "military security has been stepped up since the recent uprising"security . In contrast to Wilson's ideal, theLeague had no "teeth" to enforce peace: There was no positiveobligation of states to participate in military sanctions. Two reasonsmay explain this omission: first, the uncertainty about what technicalrequirements were necessary to enforce the obligation; second, and moreimportantly, the reservations among the states concerning thedesirability of that task.39the political leaders who created the Leagueof Nations were perfectly aware that an effective mechanism ofcollective security would imply a dramatic change of the interstatesystem An interstate system can refer to A system for international relations The U.S. Interstate Highway System in which they were involved. If the main purpose of the League of Nations was the prevention ofanother international war, the system was a complete failure. TheJapanese and Italian aggressions of the 1930s were neither prevented norresolved by the League; the outbreak of the Second World War was justthe official announcement of its demise. Nonetheless, the assumptionthat international peace can be achieved only through a system ofcollective security was never questioned. After the Second World War, the major powers reached a consensus tocreate a new international organization - the United Nations - for themaintenance of peace. This time, however, their approach was morepragmatic than in the era of the League of Nations. Article 2 of theU.N. Charter provides an absolute prohibition against states resortingto war as an instrument for resolving international conflicts.International disputes are to be settled by peaceful means, such thatpeace and security are not endangered. Like the League Covenant, theU.N. Charter has provisions for disarmament and peaceful change (Article11) and peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 14). The right of self-defense in case of aggression was alsorecognized, but in more circumscribed circumscribed/cir��cum��scribed/ (serk��um-skribd) bounded or limited; confined to a limited space. cir��cum��scribedadj.Bounded by a line; limited or confined. terms than in the League Covenant.According to Article 51, the "inherent" right of individual orcollective self-defense Collective self-defense is the act of defending other designated non-US forces. Only the National Command Authorities may authorize US forces to exercise the right of collective self-defense. can always be used in case of armed attack, butmeasures taken must be immediately reported to the U.N. SecurityCouncil. As the key organ of collective security, the Security Councilhas the authority to decide the measures necessary to maintaininternational peace and security. In further contrast to the Council of the League, the SecurityCouncil's functions are more specific. Only the Security Councilhas the authority to determine "the existence of any threat topeace, breach of peace, or act of aggression" (Article 39).Similarly, the Security Council has the power to order U.N. members toengage in non-military sanctions and deploy military forces (Articles 39to 50). The United Nations, however, does not fully achieve thecontemporary ideal of collective security. First, the U.N. Charterrequires states to supply military contingents in the event that theSecurity Council decides to undertake coercive measures against anaggressor. Second, the Security Council needs the unanimous consent In parliamentary procedure, unanimous consent, also known as general consent, is a situation in which no one present objects. The chair may state, for instance: "If there is no objection, the motion will be adopted. [pause] Since there is no objection, the motion is adopted. ofits five permanent members - the United States United States,officially United States of America, republic (2005 est. pop. 295,734,000), 3,539,227 sq mi (9,166,598 sq km), North America. The United States is the world's third largest country in population and the fourth largest country in area. , the United Kingdom,Russia, China and France - to reach a decision; it cannot takecollective security measures in case of aggression perpetrated by anyone of them. The history of the United Nations The United Nations as an international organization has its origins in World War II. Since then its aims and activities have expanded to make it the archetypal international body in the early 21st century. NamingFranklin D. demonstrates that theorganization has had profound problems in implementing a new collectivesecurity system. Global rivalry between the United States and the SovietUnion was the major - although not the sole - factor in the UnitedNations' impotence as a guarantor of international collectivesecurity. Washington's and Moscow's tendencies to exploitinternational conflicts usually preempted the possibility of reaching aSecurity Council consensus in case of aggression, especially if it wasthe result of direct superpower military involvement. The emergence ofthe opposing defensive NATO NATO:see North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATOin full North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationInternational military alliance created to defend western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. and Warsaw Pact Warsaw Pactor Warsaw Treaty OrganizationMilitary alliance of the Soviet Union, Albania (until 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, formed in 1955 in response to West Germany's entry into NATO. alliances, outside the U.N.framework, confirmed the failure of the system. The Critique of Collective Security Both the League and the United Nations have often lacked theresources and political will necessary to halt states that havecontinued to use war as a tool of statecraft state��craft?n.The art of leading a country: "They placed free access to scientific knowledge far above the exigencies of statecraft"Anthony Burgess.Noun 1. . The persistent failure ofgood intentions to preserve the peace has led to harsh attacks againstthe theory of collective security - the strongest from those thinkersknown, since Machiavelli, as political realists. For the realist, thefailure of the League of Nations and the United Nations cannot beexplained simply in terms of institutional imperfections or anunfavorable, bipolar international context. According to the realistcritic, international politics is the arena of power politics parexcellence. In contrast to domestic politics, the international order ofpower has always been both anarchical an��ar��chic? or an��ar��chi��caladj.1. a. Of, like, or supporting anarchy: anarchic oratory.b. Likely to produce or result in anarchy.2. and oligarchical ol��i��gar��chy?n. pl. ol��i��gar��chies1. a. Government by a few, especially by a small faction of persons or families.b. Those making up such a government.2. : the former,because of the absence of a monopoly of legitimate violence; the latter,because without civil society rights depend largely on might.(40) In the realist perspective, no matter what efforts were made tomitigate the absence of a common authority the state would always remainlegibus-solutus (free from the law), to undertake the use of force as ameans of its international policy. In the anarchical order of power,therefore, what matters is the national interest. For realist critics,general principles, ideologies or ethical motivations cannot explainstate actions. As Hans Morgenthau Hans Joachim Morgenthau (February 17 1904 – July 19 1980) was an International Relations theorist and one of the most influential to date. He was born in Coburg, Germany, and educated at the universities of Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich. plainly stated, "realism imposesthe judgment that statesmen think and act in terms of interest definedas power."(41) Terms like "global interest" or"international community" are therefore only rationalconstructions without any reference in the real world. As long as thenation-state persists as the basic unit of international relations,realist thinkers assume that a balance-of-power system is the onlypossible and desirable option for deterring war. According to Aron,international peace "could be safeguarded only, and alwaystemporarily, by the balance of rival powers or the victory of thestrongest and the establishment of an empire."(42) Ultimately, realism denies not only the feasibility of collectivesecurity, but also its legal foundations. In this view, the condemnationof wars of aggression is perceived as a moral standard disconnected fromreality. Since there is no clear-cut definition of what is an act ofaggression, it would be unfair - and also unrealistic - to condemn onlythe state that took the "initiative."(43) Even if not alwaysovertly stated, the realist paradigm often supports the classicinternational law principle in which all wars were equally legitimate.The most explicit representative of this position was the German jurist A judge or legal scholar; an individual who is versed or skilled in law.The term jurist is ordinarily applied to individuals who have gained respect and recognition by their writings on legal topics. juristn. Carl Schmitt Carl Schmitt (July 11 1888 – April 7 1985) was a German jurist, political theorist, and professor of law.Schmitt was born the son of a small businessman in Plettenberg, Westphalia on July 11 1888; he studied political science and law in Berlin, Munich and Strasbourg , who argued that international law must devote all effortsto the moderation, not the eradication, of war.(44) In this vein, Julien Freund, an eminent disciple of Schmitt, triesto imagine the prospect of a world in which it would be possible toenforce peace collectively. According to Freund, if the main powers ofthe world could reach a consensus about the maintenance of peace, themost probable outcome would be not the prevention of wars, but theillegitimacy illegitimacy:see bastard. Illegitimacybend sinistersupposed stigma of illegitimate birth. [Heraldry: Misc.]Clinker, Humphryservant of Bramble family turns out to be illegitimate son of Mr. Bramble. [Br. Lit. of any war not justified in terms of the values accepted bythe holders of the international order.(45) In other words, collectivesecurity could be implemented but it does not mean that war would beeradicated or a just international order established. Instead, thecreation of an international police force might lead to "the mostabsolute universal dictatorship."(46) For Freund, as for Schmitt,war lies more in the nature of politics than in the conditions of amultistate system. Even if the nation-state were eliminated, war wouldremain unless a strong and universal dictatorship were constituted toimpose peace by force. For this reason, the ideal of an internationalarmy for the maintenance of peace - much like a world-state - could be adespotic reality in which politics would become a matter of policing. On the other extreme, world federalists - the "idealist i��de��al��ist?n.1. One whose conduct is influenced by ideals that often conflict with practical considerations.2. One who is unrealistic and impractical; a visionary.3. "camp - have criticized collective security as a poor attempt to attainthe desirable goal of a world-state. Interestingly enough, the partisansof world federalism federalism.1 In political science, see federal government.2 In U.S. history, see states' rights. federalismPolitical system that binds a group of states into a larger, noncentralized, superior state while allowing them start from the same theoretical point as therealists: Peace and order can only be established through the creationof a centralized monopoly of legitimate violence. The establishment of acommon police force, judicial system and even an internationallegislature are essential features of world federalism theory. The worldfederalist fed��er��al��ist?n.1. An advocate of federalism.2. Federalist A member or supporter of the Federalist Party.adj.1. Of or relating to federalism or its advocates.2. assumes that the repressive apparatus of the state is whatkeeps the order within a political community. Therefore, a similarsystem should be implemented in the international context to avoid war. Federalist thinkers have relied on the analogy of the federal modelof state as a solution to be reproduced in the international context. Tothe crucial problem of how such a model of a worldstate could beimplemented, they have given little more than vague responses. The mostcommon proposal is that the officials of the world-state should be,somehow, appointed by peoples and not by governments.(47) In thisparadigm, the creation of a direct and universal democracy should be thelegitimate goal of the international order. Taking for granted the goalof a worldstate as desirable, the federalists - in contrast to therealists - have assumed that its realization is also possible. The "Hobbesian Trap" Realism and idealism are often presented as polar opposites ininternational politics, yet both are products of the same philosophy.Realists and federalists alike have fallen into what may be termed asthe "Hobbesian Trap," the belief that a monopoly of violenceis the necessary and sufficient condition for peace and order within agiven community. Since the basic argument of both theories is the actualdifference between domestic order and international anarchy, one mustlook at how peace could be established and preserved in internalpolitics in order to evaluate the legitimacy of a collective securitysystem. The centralization of power and the use of legitimate violence inthe hands of a single authority has been a major trait in the process ofstate-building. Only through the monopoly of violence and the gradualcreation of national armies and police forces could the modern stateestablish order and stop wars waged by private armies. In this respect,Hobbes was right: No sword in the hands of a Leviathan, no peace. Even if the realists are correct in their assumption that theexistence of a superior and unchallenged force is essential for imposingpeace in the absence of order, they do not provide a satisfactory answerto the issue of how order is maintained; the threat of force is only apartial explanation. Individuals obey law primarily to the extent towhich the legal order reflects the values accepted by their community.When the foundations of the legal order are undergoing profound changes,the gap between the actual behavior of individuals and the values of thenew system tends to increase; governments will be then more likely touse the threat of force in order to obtain compliance. Still the fate ofany legal order - no matter how conservative or revolutionary - dependsin the long run on being freely accepted by those who must live underit. The legitimacy of the legal order - and not only the coerciveenforcement of the law - explains the maintenance of peace within agiven community. As the contemporary example of the fall of the Sovietbloc demonstrates, even the strongest dictatorships were doomed tocollapse when they failed to keep popular support. The conditions of international order are profoundly analogous tothose of domestic order. The main function of international law is toreflect the common values and principles accepted by the internationalcommunity in a given historical period. These principles may requiretime to be fully implemented. The proscription of war as a means ofinternational policy, the pacific settlement of disputes, and even thecommitment to an international organization for the improvement of theworld order, cannot be realized until states and their leaders freelyaccept the mutual benefits of the maintenance of peace. The actual impossibility of implementing these principles shouldnot be cause either to renounce the effort or desperately try to changereality. The realists propose the former solution, the world federaliststhe latter. Both rely on force as a necessary condition for keeping thepeace in the international context: The realists leave the threat ofcoercion in the hands of each state, while the federalists propose thecreation of a super-state to centralize the use of violence. Between the maintenance of a balance-of-power system and thecreation of a world-state, the contemporary concept of collectivesecurity stands in an uncertain point. Collective security clearlydenies the use of war as an instrument of international policy, but itdoes not offer a better solution than the gradual evolution toward aninternational military force in the hands of an executive internationalbody. Realists and federalists are both correct in their critique ofcollective security: There is a contradiction between the existence of amultistate system and the requirement of an international authoritycapable of imposing collective security measures by force. Kant understood the core of this problem and, by stressing theconsensual basis of international order, transcended both the realistand idealist positions. He rejected the realist contention that stateshave a right to go to war; for Kant, the existence of war is not anargument for its legitimacy. Kant also denounced the idealist proposalof a federal union capable of enforcing international peace asimpossible and, moreover, undesirable; this option could lead touniversal despotism despotism,government by an absolute ruler unchecked by effective constitutional limits to his power. In Greek usage, a despot was ruler of a household and master of its slaves. and a renewal of punitive wars. Contemporary theorists of collective security should reconsiderKant's position, and escape from the Hobbesian Trap. Theenforcement of peace could be an instrument to win a war against anyaggressor, but neither implies the prevention of future wars, nor thepossibility of a more fair and lasting peace. Conclusions: Kant in the Post-Cold War Order It is a cliche to say that the so-called international order is infact based on an anarchic an��ar��chic? or an��ar��chi��caladj.1. a. Of, like, or supporting anarchy: anarchic oratory.b. Likely to produce or result in anarchy.2. multistate system. States still rely on theirmight to deter aggression and there is little common ground of sharedvalues among them. Yet the world faces the frustrating reality of anintrnmational law that lacks effective instruments of enforcement. Giventhese conditions, the possibility of a peaceful international orderfaces the difficult task of avoiding "the Charybdis of subservience sub��ser��vi��ent?adj.1. Subordinate in capacity or function.2. Obsequious; servile.3. Useful as a means or an instrument; serving to promote an end. to state ambitions and the Scylla of excessive pretensions ofrestraint."(48) There are, I fear, no easy solutions to thisproblem. Until states freely accept that it is in their own interest topreserve peace and renounce the use of violence in international policy,no lastingly peaceful international order can be established. Theimplementation of an effective collective security system, or thecreation of a federalist world-state, are only illusory solutions to theproblem of war. Even if peace could be enforced by a coalition oflike-minded states or by a single international authority, it would notimply that war could be prevented or a fair peace preserved. Stateconsensus about a legal order, not the threat of coercion, explains themaintenance of peace. Under this approach, defensive wars, waged by asingle state or an alliance, though limited and subjected to legalcontrol, cannot be outlawed - at least in the foreseeable future. Certain commentators who suggest that a new international order hasemerged from the collapse of the Soviet bloc are overly optimistic. Theseeming triumph of the liberal democratic idea did put an end to theEast-West conflict that, for much of the twentieth century, impeded agreat power consensus on the legitimacy of the international order. Notall nations of the world, however, are ready to accept that order.Border disputes, and ethnic and religious conflicts are a growing sourceof war in the international system. In this context, the implementationof a collective security system - the illusion that universal peace nowcan be enforced - only implies the risk of justifying punitive warsagainst maverick aggressors. This is the lesson of the war between the U.N.-led, U.S.-backedcoalition and Iraq in the Persian Gulf. The Gulf War case is special,because it occurred in the new international context. As the SovietUnion did not oppose the armed intervention against Iraq'saggression, the United Nations was able to play an unprecedentedrole.(49) It is partially true that the key element in forming aninternational coalition, as Henry Kissinger stated, was the Americanleadership and not that of the United Nations." If not a perfectresemblance to the collective security ideal, nonetheless the Gulf Wargave a good idea of how such a system might practically work. Yet the prospects are not promising. The international sanctionaccorded the Gulf War justified the use of every means of destructionagainst the Iraqis. Although the conflict did not reach the extreme ofthe absolute destruction of Baghdad and its civilian population, thispossibility was clearly part of its logic. As the U.N.-led collectivesecurity system appeared more effective after the end of the Cold War,the problem of its desirability and humaneness needs to be debated. From a different perspective, the existing conditions of the worldorder offer a unique chance to attain, in the long run, a non-coerciveinternational peace. The United Nations has the potential to adapt itsstructures and activities to that purpose. The first step is toreformulate Verb 1. reformulate - formulate or develop again, of an improved theory or hypothesisredevelopformulate, explicate, develop - elaborate, as of theories and hypotheses; "Could you develop the ideas in your thesis" the concept of collective security as an internationalconfederation of states that have agreed to renounce war and committhemselves to the maintenance of world peace by non-coercive means. Inorder to extend the consensus about the international system, the UnitedNations must improve the mechanisms of peaceful settlements of disputes,advocate universal disarmament, devise strategies of preventivediplomacy Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. and create new methods to facilitate a peaceful change in thestatus quo [Latin, The existing state of things at any given date.] Status quo ante bellum means the state of things before the war. The status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. in case of conflict. An excessive stress on the use of coercion is clearly inappropriateto resolve the emerging ethnic and religious conflicts in the world. Inthese cases, the key activity of a post-cold War United Nations must beto extend and strengthen the use of peaceful forces. The conflictsaffecting countries like Somalia and the former Yugoslavia presentopportunities to work in this direction. The United Nations should also rely on the existing instruments forthe protection of human rights, and devise new mechanisms to promoteeconomic development in the less-developed areas of the world. Theseactivities, in turn, could not only increase the legitimacy of theinternational order, but also help consolidate democracy. This is in thebest interest of the international community because, as Kant foresaw,the diffusion of governments based on popular consent limits thelikelihood of war. My conclusions may seem frustrating for strong proponents of a newworld order. Deep deception, however, is often caused by highexpectations. Mankind has no other option than to rely on Kant'shopeful insight: If peace, as it seems, is a rational and moralimperative of human nature, it cannot be meaningless. If the propersteps are taken, then peace may one day become reality.(1.) I want to express my gratitude to Assistant Professor AndersStephanson for Ids valuable comments on an earlier draft of thisarticle, as well as to the Jurnal editorial staff for their assistancein preparing it for publication. (2.) Thomas Hobbes, De Cim, ed. BemardGert (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978) p. 118. (3.) SeeReinhartkoselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and thePathogenesis of modern Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988) pp.4346. For a detailed juridical analysis of the evolution of Europeaninternational law, see Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Volkerrechtdes Jus Publicum Europaeum (Koln: Greven Verlag, 1950). (4.) Kant'sPerpetual Peace pamphlet is reprinted in Immanuel Kant, On History, ed.and trans. Lewis White Beck Lewis White Beck (September 26, 1913 - June 7, 1997) was a scholar in German philosophy. Beck was Burbank Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at the University of Rochester and served as the Philosophy Department chair there from 1949 to 1966. (New York New York, state, United StatesNew York,Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of : I)obbs-merrill, 1963). (5.) CarlFriedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press The Harvard University Press is a publishing house, a division of Harvard University, that is highly respected in academic publishing. It was established on January 13, 1913. In 2005, it published 220 new titles. ,1948) pp. 157-87. (6.) Abbe de Saint-Pierre, A Project for PerpetualPeace (New York: Garland, 1974). (7.) Ibid., pp. 24-9. (8.) Ibid., p.16. (9.) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Judgement on Perpetual Peace (New York:Garland, 1974) pp. 102-3. (10.) Kant, On History, p. 92. My emphasis.(11.) Ibid., pp. 85-91. (12.) "Beween states no punitive war(bellum punitivum) is conceivable because there is no relation betweenthem of master and servant An archaic generic legal phrase that is used to describe the relationship arising between an employer and an employee.A servant is anyone who works for another individual, the master, with or without pay. ." ibid., p. 90. (13.) Koselleck, p. 46.An excellent summary of the arguments against the doctrine of the justwar is provided by Norberto Bobbio, Il Problema della guerra e le Viedella Pace, II ed. (Bolgna: Il Mulino, 1984). For different perspectivesabout the problem of the moral justification of war, see Jean BethkeElshtain Jean Bethke Elshtain (born 1941) is a neoconservative American feminist political philosopher. She is the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, and is a contributing editor for The New Republic. , ed., Just War Theory (New York: New York University Press New York University Press (or NYU Press), founded in 1916, is a university press that is part of New York University. External linkNew York University Press ,1992). (14.) W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press (known colloquially as CUP) is a publisher given a Royal Charter by Henry VIII in 1534, and one of the two privileged presses (the other being Oxford University Press). , 1978) p. 19. (15.) Le Droit Le Droit (established on March 27, 1913) is a Canadian daily newspaper, published in Ottawa, Canada and is operated by Gesca since 2000. HistoryThe newspaper was launched at that period as a tool to condemn Bill 17, an Ontario legislation that abolished education de Gens; ou LesPrincipes de la Loi Naturelle Appliques a la Conduite et aux Affairesdes Nations et des Souverains (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution ofWashington The introduction to this article may be too long. Please help improve the introduction by moving some material from it into the body of the article according to the suggestions at , 1916) III. 4, paragraph 68. (16.) In the third of thepreliminary articles of peace, after proposing the abolishment ofstanqing armies, Kant acknowledges that "the periodic and voluntarymilitary exercises of citizens who thereby secure themselves and theircountry against foreign aggression are entirely different." (17.)ibid., pp. 92-105. (18.) For an analysis of individual rights and thenotion of cosmopolitan law in Kant's concept of peace, see NorbertoBobbio, "Kant e la Revoluzione Francese," in Norberto Bobbio,L'Eta del Diritti (Torino: Einaudi, 1992) pp. 143-55. (19.) Kant,On History, p. 94. (20.) In the Metaphysics of Morals The Metaphysics of Life (Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797) is a major work of moral philosophy by Immanuel Kant. It is not as well known or as widely read as his earlier works, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant takes thestance that the state has no right to lead a human being - who in arepublic is also a citizen - into war without his consent. "Acitizen, he says, must always be regarded as a co-legislative member ofthe state (that is not merely as a means but at the same time as an endin itself) and as such he must give his free consent through hisrepresentatives, not only to the waging of war in general, but also toany particular declaration of war." ibid. pp. 94-5. Immanuel Kant,The Metaphysic met��a��phys��ic?n.1. a. Metaphysics.b. A system of metaphysics.2. An underlying philosophical or theoretical principle: a belief in luck, the metaphysic of the gambler. Elements of Justice, ed. and trans. John Ladd (New York:Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p. 118 (21.) Kant, On History, p. 98; Kant,Metaphysical Elements, p. 116. (22.) Immanuel Kant, Per la PacePerpetua, ed. Norberto Bobbio (Roma: Editori Reuniti, 1992) p. XVI.(23.) The idea of a state of nations, says Kant, "would becontradictory since the state implies the relation of a superior(legislating) to an inferior (obeying), i.e, the people, and any nationsin one state would then constitute only one nation." Kant, OnHistory, p. 98. (24.) Ibid., p. 100. (25.) Ibid., p. 113. (26.) For ageneral explanation of the nature and function of moral laws inKant's ethics, see Metaphysical Elements, pp. 10-30. (27.) ibid.,p. 128. "What duty requires," says Kant, "is that we actin accordance with the idea of such an end, even if there is not theslightest theoretical probability that it is feasible, as along as itsimpossibility cannot be demonstrated either." ibid., p. 128. (28.)See Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from aCosmopolitan Point of View," and "An Old Question RaisedAgain: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" in On History,pp. 11-26 and 137-54. (29.) Kant, On History, p. 106. (30.) E.H. Carr,The Twenty Years TWENTY YEARS. The lapse of twenty years raises a presumption of certain facts, and after such a time, the party against whom the presumption has been raised, will be required to prove a negative to establish his rights. 2. Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) p.26. (31.) Woodrow Wilson, "A league of Peace," in David L.Larsen, The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy (Princeton,NJ: Van Nostrand, 1966) p. 183. (32.) ibid., p. 183. (33.) John F.L.Ross, Neutrality and International Sanctions International sanctions are actions taken by countries against others for political reasons, either unilaterally or multilaterally.There are three types of sanctions. Diplomatic sanctions - the reduction or removal of diplomatic ties, such as embassies. (New York: Praeger, 1989)p. 12. (34.) Inis Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (New York: RandomHouse, 1971) p. 160. (35.) ibid., p. 257. (36.) Alfred Zimmern, TheLeague of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (London: Macmillan,1939) p. 289. (37.) Inis Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations(New York: Random House, 1962)p. 262. (38.) F.P. Walters, A history ofthe League of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 44.(39.) Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 153. (40.) RaymondAron Raymond-Claude-Ferdinand Aron (March 14, 1905 — October 17, 1983) was a French philosopher, sociologist and political scientist, well known to the broad public for his skeptical analyses of the post-war vogue in France for ideologies that took their inspiration from the , "The Anarchical Order of Power," in Stanley Hoffman,ed., Conditions of World Order (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Houghton Mifflin Company is a leading educational publisher in the United States. The company's headquarters is located in Boston's Back Bay. It publishes textbooks, instructional technology materials, assessments, reference works, and fiction and non-fiction for both young readers , 1968) p.47. (41.) Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf,1960) p. 5. (42.) Aron, p. 30. (43.) See Raymond Aron, Peace and WarAmong Nations (New York: Doubleday, 1966) p. 159. (44.) See CarlSchmitt, El Nomos de la Tierra en el Derecho De`re´chon. 1. A straight wind without apparent cyclonic tendency, usually accompanied with rain and often destructive, common in the prairie regions of the United States. de Gentes gen��tes?n.Plural of gens. del Juo PublicumEuropaeum (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constituciondes) pp. 283-364, inwhich he discusses the extent of the criminalization crim��i��nal��ize?tr.v. crim��i��nal��ized, crim��i��nal��iz��ing, crim��i��nal��iz��es1. To impose a criminal penalty on or for; outlaw.2. To treat as a criminal. of wars ofagression intended by contemporary international law. For hisunderstanding of the relation between war, politics and legal order seeCarl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick New Brunswick, province, CanadaNew Brunswick,province (2001 pop. 729,498), 28,345 sq mi (73,433 sq km), including 519 sq mi (1,345 sq km) of water surface, E Canada. , NJ: RutgersUniversity Press Rutgers University Press is a nonprofit academic publishing house, operating in Piscataway, New Jersey under the auspices of Rutgers University. The press was founded in 1936, and since that time has grown in size and in the scope of its publishing program. , 1976). (45.) Julien Freund, L'Essence duPolitique (Paris: Sirey, 1965) pp. 493 and 499. (46.) Julien Freund, LeNouvel Age (Paris: Marcel Riviere ri��vi��re?n.A necklace of precious stones, generally set in one strand.[French rivi��re (de diamants), river (of diamonds), from Old French rivere, from Vulgar Latin , 1970) p. 202. (47.) Claude, SwordsInto Plowshares, p. 416. (48.) Stanley Hoffman, "International Lawand the Control of Force," in Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffman,The Relevance of International Law: Essays in Honor of Leo Leo, in astronomyLeo[Lat.,=the lion], northern constellation lying S of Ursa Major and on the ecliptic (apparent path of the sun through the heavens) between Cancer and Virgo; it is one of the constellations of the zodiac. Gross(Cambridie, MA: Schenkman, 1968) p. 44. (49.) Although the 1950 U.N.intervention in South Korea has been hailed as a victory forinternational peace and security, the mission was merely"authorized" and not "decided" by the UnitedNations. The formation of the coalition was driven by the United States,whose influence in the United Nations made it possible to overridetemporarily the Soviet veto in the Security Council. See "TheUN's Roles in a Divided World,"' in Adam Roberts Adam Roberts (born 1965) is an academic , critic and novelist. He also writes parodies under the pseudonym of A..R.R.R Roberts (as a play on words of J.R.R Tolkien.) He has a degree in English from the University of Git and a PhD from Cambridge University on Robert Browning andBenedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided Role (New York:Clarendom, 1990). (50.) Henry Kissinger, "A False Dream, "inthe Gulf War Reader (New York: Random House, 1991) P. 462.